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AN UNCERTAIN PRIVILEGE: IMPLIED WAIVER AND 

THE EVISCERATION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST­

PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 

Deirdre M. Smith* 
An uncertai n privilege , or one which purports to be certain but re­
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than 
no privilege at aiJ.l 
I NTROD UCTIO N 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is, in many respects, in its nas­
cent years in t he federal courts, having been first recogn ized by the 
U nited States Supreme Court only twelve years ago in Jaffee v. R ed­
mond.2 In holding t hat federal courts mus t pro tect confidential com­
munications arising in psychotherapy notwithsta nding the " likely 
evide ntiary benefit" of such communica tions, t he Supreme Court 
reasoned: 
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilita t­
ing the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering 
the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental health of 
our citizenry , no less than its physical health , is a public good of 
transcenden t importa nce.3 
Psychotherapy is t he context in which, perhaps more tha n in any 
o ther, a person is most likely to reveal unflattering inform ation abou t 
herself, as well as her fears , vu lnerabilities , guilt, disappointme nts, 
d oubts, and anxieties. By recognizing t he p rivilege in broad terms, the 
Court appeared to create a wall of protection against disclosure of 
such statements in litigation, including responses to discovery re­
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., University of Penn­
sylvania, 1988; J .D., University of Maine School of Law, 1994. I am grateful to the following 
people who read earlier drafts of this article and provided many helpful insights: Colin Miller, 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Deborah Tuerkheimer, and Jennifer Wriggins. I am appreciative of 
Dean Peter Pitegoff for providing generous summer research support, and of the staff of the 
Donald L. Garbrecht Law Library for its research assistance. 
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 393 (1981)). 
2. See i.d. 
3. Jd. at 11. 
79 

80 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79 
quests ,4 marking the first time tha t the Court had recognized the over­
riding significa nce of mental health trea tment. 
Now that Jaffee is in its second decade, we can begin to take stock 
of its vitality and impact. In the short time since Jaffee , the federal 
courts have created a body of law in disarray, with inconsistent ap­
proaches to e nforcement of the privilege found even within the same 
districts The source of the chaos is the courts' contradictory treat­
ment of the question of when a civil litigant is deemed to have waived 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental condition 
in issue through the assertion of a particular claim or defense. The 
issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege can arise in 
any case in which a plaintiff who has received mental health treatme nt 
at some point in her life seeks emotional distress damages. The fed­
eral case law on this question, however, has developed almost exclu­
sively in the context of civil rights cases.6 Since the federal court 
system is a primary forum for the vindication of civil rights claims, 
such as those alleging discrimination or excessive force, the federal 
courts' approaches to the psychothe rapist-patient privilege and their 
conceptualization of waiver of the privilege can have a crucial impact 
on the course of civil rights litigation and on whether litigation even 
occurs? Properly framed, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can 
serve as a critical tool to ensure that those with mental illness may 
enforce their rights unde r federal law without concern that their 
mental health histories will become a central issue in the litigation. 
Conversely, waiver formulations can chill federal civil rights litigation, 
4. Id. Under the Federal RuJes of Evidence, the rules with respect to privileges apply not only 
to the admissibility of evidence at trial but to " all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings. " 
FED. R. Evro. 1101(c). 
5. Lynne Bernabei & Andrew Schroeder, Protect Clients ' Private Health Records, T RIAL, Sept. 
2004, at 32, 33 (noting that it is difficuJt for a plaintiff's counsel to predict " which theory of 
waiver [of the psychotherapist-patient privilege] a court will adopt" due to the Jack of uniformity 
within jurisdictions) . Compare Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, 
at *11 (S.D .N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006) (rejecting argument that plaintiff waived psychotherapist-patient 
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages), with Manessis v. New York City Dep't of 
Transp., No. 02-CIV359, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) (reaching the oppo­
site conclusion on the same question) . 
6. Of the dozens of federal cases considering implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege cited herein and otherwise identified during the course of my research, only three arose 
outside the civil rights context. See Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL 
3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (insurance coverage); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic 
Assocs., II, P.C., 2004 WL 1813232 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2004) (medical malpractice); Adams v. 
Ardcor, 196 F.R. D. 339 (E.D. Wise. 2000) (industrial accident). 
7. Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 32 (assuming that plaintiffs likely do not choose in 
which forum to litigate a discrimination case, where given a choice, based upon the level of 
protection provided to confidential medical records, but noting that the choice of forum can 
dictate the degree to which medical records much be disclosed) . 
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virtually ensuring that some plaintiffs' civil rights will never be 
vindicated. 
Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of recog­
nizing and enforcing a psychotherapy patient 's right to maintain the 
confidentiality of he r communications, lowe r courts have eroded the 
privilege beyond recognition through the notion of implied waiver. 
While the case law is entirely unsettled, one fact has clearly e merged: 
by filing suit in fede ral court seeking any form of compensation fo r 
psychic injury, a plaintiff runs a substantial risk that he r current and 
past me ntal health treatment will become a focus of discovery and 
perhaps of the defense theory at trial. With a significant number of 
individuals in the United States seeking mental he alth treatment,8 and 
with recent e nhance ment of remedies available under fede ral civil 
rights laws,9 courts' expansive views of waiver have resulted in a colli­
sion between plaintiffs' efforts to vindicate their civil rights in fede ral 
court and defendants' ability to exploit the issues that arise in plain­
tiffs' mental health tre atment to gain an advantage in litigation. How­
ever, in developing the waiver doctrine , courts utte rly fail to weigh the 
potential impact on future plaintiffs' decisions whether to pursue civil 
rights claims at all. 
Prior scholarship on the development of the psychotherapist-patie nt 
privilege in fede ral courts has note d the sharp division in the courts on 
the issue of waiver.10 This schola rship, however, has neither consid­
ered the broader impact of such uncertainty on the role of fede ral 
courts in protecting civil rights nor advanced an alternative configura­
tion of waiver to be adopted in this context. This Article analyzes the 
questions implicate d by waiver of the psychotherapist-patie nt privi­
lege and proposes a reasoned and cohe rent approach to resolving 
waiver disputes to ensure that the concept of waiver does not vitiate 
8. Studies conducted in 1993 and 1996 estimated that approximately eleven percent of adults 
in t he United States received professional mental health treatment each year. R onald C Kessler 
et a!., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 36 HEALTH SERVICES 
REs. 987 (2001 ); Darrel A . Regier eta!., The De Facto US Mental and Addictive Disorders Ser­
vice System. Epidemiologic Calchment A rea Prospective 1-Year Prevalence Rales of Disorders 
and Services , 50 ARCH IVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 85. The United States Surgeon 
General cited both articles in Menlal Health: A R eport of the Surgeon General (1999), at ch. 2, 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ mentalhealth/chapter2/sec7.html. 
9. See infra notes 25- 28 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health Provider Privilege in the Wake of Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 591 (2001); Ryan M. G ott, Note, The Evolving Treatment of" Gar­
den-Variety" Claims Under the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 SuFFOLK J. T RIAL & APP. 
Aovoc . 91 (2001); Ellen E . McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow 
Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369 
(2001) . 
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t he privilege entirely and t herefore undermine the importa nt purposes 
it serves. 
Part II of t his Article examines the role of mental health evidence 
during discovery in civil litiga tion, pa rticularly in federal civil rights 
cases , the context in which the issues of the psychotherapist-patie nt 
privilege and waiver issues generally arise. 11 Part III then traces the 
origins of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege to the Supreme 
Court's Jaffee opinion and reviews the various assumptions and ratio­
nales that shaped the debate regarding the development of the privi­
lege in t he state legislatu res and eventually in the federal courts.1 2 
Part IV reviews and critiques the post-Jaffee case law rega rding im­
plied waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege.B The courts' in­
consistent approaches stem from t he significa nt variation in their 
conceptualizations of the privilege and of waiver, as well as t he under­
lying rationales of each. Federal courts too often fail to apply the 
broade r principles implicated by questions of whether one has waived 
a legally protected right. Mos t significa ntly, courts do not predicate a 
finding of waiver on whether the holde r of that right took some af­
firma tive step that can be properly characterized as waiving t he right. 
Instead, under the guise of implied waiver, many courts analyze the 
controversy employing conside rations of privacy and fairness devel­
oped unde r the rules governing discovery procedure. O t hers allow 
conceptions of releva nce and evidentiary value-expressly disallowed 
by Jaffe- to creep into or do minate t he analysis of waiver questions. 
Such considera tions, however, have no place in a determination of 
waiver. 
In Part V, the Article proposes a new fra mework for analyzing is­
sues of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, especially in 
t he discovery contextY It firs t offers an alternative conceptualization 
of the underlying rationale of t he privilege. Specifically, the privilege 
encourages individuals to seek remedies fo r violations of t heir civil 
rights who might otherwise be discouraged from doing so out of fea r 
t hat t heir mental health treatment history will become a central issue 
in the litiga tion. Part V then adva nces a new approach tha t is consis­
tent with both the Supreme Court's formulation of the privilege in 
Jaffee and with the broade r principles applicable to questions of 
waiver.15 Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court must provide 
11. See infra notes 17-44 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 45- 132 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 133- 324 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 325- 349 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 350-394 and accompanying text. 
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guidance to lower courts on the issue of waiver of the psychotherapist­
patient privilege in order to preserve me aningful access to the federal 
courts for all individuals, regardless of their history of me ntal health 
treatment.16 
II. DISCOVERY OF MENTAL H EALTH R E CORDS 

IN CiviL L ITIGATION 

The operation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is at issue 
most often and most contentiously when a defendant in a civil action 
involving claims for e motional distress damages seeks records, testi­
mony, and other information regarding a plaintiff's current and past 
mental health treatmentP U nrestricted access to a plaintiff's mental 
health records, particularly notes and records from psychotherapy ses­
sions and diagnostic evaluations, can yield some of the most valuable 
discovery to a defendant. Such records may provide the most direct 
and uninfluenced view of the plaintiff, her life, her opinions, her per­
sonality, and her vulne rabilities.18 Mental health records may contain 
admissions about the incident at issue in the litigation, or even the 
plaintiff's impressions of the litigation itself. Alternatively, mental 
health records may place the incident at issue in the litigation in con­
text by revealing othe r circumstances in the plaintiff's life, such as 
marital problems and struggles with childhood trauma.19 
By contrast, other forms of discovery generally yield less useful in­
formation. Non-psychotherapy medical records tend to reveal little , 
as physicians typically do not record- or later recollect- a patient's 
statements during a fifteen-minute office visit. Plaintiffs' lawyers draft 
interrogatory answers with the object of disclosing as little as possible. 
Depositions occur once litigation is underway, after extensive prepa­
ration sessions with counsel, and when a litigant is quite guarded 
about making revelations in response to questions from opposing 
counsel. Psychotherapy records, however, contain few siinilar mediat­
16. See infra notes 395-400 and accompanying text. 
17. See Michael L. Orenstein, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 20 Tou Ro L. REv. 679, 
679 (2004) (noting that the issue of privilege generally arises when a defendant is seeking a 
plaintiff's mental health records) . 
18. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("The psychiatric patient 
confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what 
his words dir ectly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his 
shame." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MANFRED S. GurrMACHER & HENRY 
WEtHOFEN, PsYCHIATRY AND T HE LAw 272 (1952))) . 
19. Albert M. Drukteinis notes that a " critical factor" in determining causation in " mental 
damage" claims is " longitudinal life history. " Albert M. Drukteinis, Understanding and EvaltuU­
ing Mental Damages, PsYCHIATRIC T IMES, Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://www.psychiatric 
times.com/display/article/10168155241. 
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ing influences. The informa tion is as close to a peek into a litigant's 
mind as one can presently achieve through discovery.20 Thus, defend­
ants' attorneys are highly motivated to develop crea tive arguments to 
gain access to such records, and plaintiffs ' attorneys are at leas t as 
equally motivated to resist such arguments. 
The most commonly offered rationale by civil defendants in support 
of their discovery requests for psychotherapy records is a plaintiff's 
claim for emotional distress damages.21 In the 1990s, a confluence of 
factors tra nsformed the landscape of e motional distress damages in 
federal civil rights actions, which themselves comprise a substa ntial 
proportion of civil matters in which plaintiffs seek recovery for per­
sonal injuries.22 Prior to that time, the primary vehicles for collecting 
emotional distress damages in federal courts were either tort actions 
based upon diversity of the pa rties, or civil rights actions brought pur­
suant to § 1983,23 through which plaintiffs could receive most sta te­
law tort remedies.24 In 1990, Congress e nacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which greatly expanded the reach of the anti­
discrimination provisions of the Re habilita tion Act to include a signif­
icant number of public and private e ntities and e mployers.25 A yea r 
later, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,26 which extended 
the right to seek compensa tory damages, including damages for emo­
20. Access to treatment notes covering treatment prior to the litigation, or even the incident 
at issue, can be particularly valuable since it avoids the common "contaminating factors" that 
can be present in forensic psychological examinations. Jd. 
21. See, e.g. , Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 133 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
22 . In 2007, civil rights complaints comprised twelve percent of all civil case filings in the 
federal courts, a figure slightly lower than the number of personal injury and product liability 
filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CoURT, FEDERAL CoURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/crnsd2007.pl (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) . The remaining catego­
ries of civil filings (e.g. social security, prisoner filings , forfeitures , contracts, intellectual property 
matters) do not generally involve recovery for personal injuries. 
23. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000). 
24. DAN B. DoBBs, THE LAw oF ToRTS 82 (2000) ("Section 1983 authorizes tort claims for 
deprivation of federal rights under color of state Jaw."). 
25. Americans with D isabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008); 
see also Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
26. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U .S.C. 
§ 1981A (2000)); see§ 1981A(b)(3) (listing damages available to victims of intentional discrimi­
nation as including compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffer­
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, Joss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses"). 
The award of damages is subject to caps, based upon the size of the employer. § 1981A(b)(3). 
In recent years, an increasing number of clinical studies have documented the potential psycho­
logical impact of discrimination. See generally SHARYN A NN LENHART, CLINICAL AsPECTS oF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: PsYCHOLOGICAL CoNSEQUENCES AND 
T REATMENT INTERVENTIONS (2004); Melba J .T. Vasquez et al., Assessing Employment Discrimi­
nation and Harassment, in 2 HANDBOOK oF PsYCHOLOGY: FoRENSIC PsYCHOLOGY 259- 74 
(Alan Goldstein ed., 2003) . 
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tional distress , to employment discrimination plaintiffs pursu ing 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 a nd the 
A D A.28 
As a result of these two statutes , mental health issues quickly be­
came predominant in employment discrimination cases.29 Whereas 
p reviously employers ' attorneys argued t ha t access to a plaintiff's 
mental health records was necessary to defend on the issu e of liabil­
ity,30 the availability of emotional distress d amages and the expansion 
of discrimina tion claims based upon mental illness e nhanced the rele­
vancy arguments rega rding access to these records.31 The same yea r 
of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pu blic awareness of 
sexual harassment brou ght about by t he confirmation hearings of 
Clarence Thomas may have led to a multifold increase in sexual har­
assment claims.32 These trends were well u nderway when the Su ­
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-3 (2000). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008) . 
29. James J. McDonald, J r. & Francine B. Kulick, Preface to MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJU­
RIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION xxxvi - xxxvii (James J. McDonald, J r. & Francine B. Kulick 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES]. 
30. See, e.g. , i.d. at 219 (explaining that an employee's pre-existing " personality disorder" may 
" produce cognitive distortions and unreasonable expectations and demands that may impact 
liability issues in an employment lawsuit"); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 
F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Aa. 1988) (denying discovery of sexual harassment plaintiffs ment al 
health treatment where defendant sought to establish plaintiffs " hypersensitivity to 
pornography"). 
31. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employment discrimination plain­
tiffs frequently included separate tort claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as a means to seek compensatory damages for emotional distress. See, e.g. , Green v. 
Am. Broad. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D.D.C. 1986). However, plaintiffs must prove each of 
the elements of those torts in order to recover emotional distress damages and such efforts are 
not always successful . /d. at 1362~ (granting summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Also, some courts have held that such tort 
claims aJe pre-empted by state workers' compensation statutes. See generally Jarod S. Gonzales, 
State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the 
Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REv. 115 (2007). 
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filings reflected a more than twofold in­
crease in sexual haJassment cases over a five -yeaJ period, from 6127 in 1991 to 15,342 in 1996. 
Jennifer Steinhauer, If the Boss is Out of Line, What's the Legal Boundary? Testing a Wider 
Concept of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at DL See also Noelle C. Brennan, 
Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: The Hostile Environment of a Courtroom , 
44 DEPAUL L. REv. 545, 545 n.3 (1995) ("In the three months following the Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported a 
70% increase in reports of sexual haJassment, as compared to the previous year. "); Allen R. 
Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up the Fight, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1 
(reviewing possible causes of increase in employment discrimination filings and noting that 
" [e]xperts attribute the growth in sexual-haJassment cases to Anita Hill's confrontation of Judge 
ClaJence Thomas at his Supreme Court confirmation hearings"). However, it is not apparent to 
what extent the increase in filings is attributable to the Hill-Thomas controversy or the expan­
sion of available remedies. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily: 
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preme Court first recognized t he psychotherapist-patient privilege in 
Jaffee in 1996. 
A claim for emotional distress damages raises issues of causation, 
severity, and sincerity, including whether a plaintiff is accurately stat­
ing t he source o r extent of her emotional distress.33 Mental health 
records may offer tools for defendants seeking to limit damages by 
challenging the claim on any of those aforementioned issues.34 Estab­
lishing causa tion for emotional distress damages is not a straightfor­
ward task. Given the complexity of t he human psyche, a defendant 
can argue that anything in a plaintiff's life contributed to her emo­
tional or mental condition.35 Psychotherapy treatment notes may re­
veal " prior or concurrent alternative stressors, such as childhood 
sexual abuse or marital discord," any of which could arguably be a 
contributing or alternative cause of e motional distress.36 Thus, de­
fe ndants have easily fashioned and found support for superficially 
valid arguments for a need to obtain a wide ra nge of mental health 
New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. PosT, May 12, 1997, at A 1 ("Employment 
discrimination cases are surging into the federal courts in record numbers, more than doubling in 
the past four years because of new laws and new attitudes in the workplace.»). 
33. Drukteinis, supra note 19. 
34. David A. Cathcart, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress, and Puni­
tive Damages In Employment Cases, C108 ALI-ABA 547 (1995). Mr. Cathcart explained: 
Employers should explore in discovery alternative causes for the plaintiff's alleged 
emotional distress. Employers should consult with psychiatric or psychological experts 
as necessary or appropriate to develop discovery on injuries and to perform examina­
tion of the plaintiffs ment al state. Such matters might include recent divorce, bank­
ruptcy, surgery, accidents, or other traumatic personal events. All prior psychiatric 
records of the plaintiff should be requested. 
/d. ; see John H. Mason & Christopher L. Ekman, Defending Against Damages Claims In Dis­
crimination Cases, 13 LAB. LAw. 471, 495 (1998) ("[I]n order to defend against a claim of emo­
tional distress in a discrimination case, the defendant employer should seek to establish, through 
discovery of the plaintiff's medical or psychiatric records or otherwise, possible pre-existing or 
alternate sources of the plaintiffs alleged emotional distress."); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Sexual 
Harassment Cases in the Courts, or Therapy Goes to War: Supporting a Sexual Harassment Vic­
tim During Litigation, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WoRKPLACE AND ACADEMIA: PsYCHI­
ATRIC IssuEs 133, 142 (Diane K. Shrier ed., 1996) ("In the effort to minimize [emotional 
distress] damages, the defendant's attorney will leave no stone untumed. This is where the dis­
covery process becomes nastiest."). 
35. Similarly, defendants have successfully sought and obtained marital counseling records in 
loss of consortium claims. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 622-23 (S.D. 
Cal. 1996) (recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege pre-Jaffee, but also finding waiver 
based solely upon plaintiffs' claim for loss of consortium as part of an excessive force , wrongful 
death claim) . 
36. James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preparing the Case for the Expert, in 
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES, supra note 29, at 262, 272. The authors of this defense­
oriented book suggest several questions to be asked of a discrimination plaintiff for the purpose 
of eliciting information about the plaintiffs mental health. /d. at 279-82. 
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evide nce.37 Defendants who plan to use me ntal health professionals 
as either testifying or consulting experts are particularly motivated to 
access as much information as possible about a plaintiff's mental 
health history and present condition.38 
At the same time, a plaintiff may be horrified to learn that her psy­
chotherapy history will be made available, not only to the opposing 
counsel, but also to the opposing party (perhaps an e mployer who 
subjected her to sexual harassment), the court, the jury, and the gen­
37. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("'t is not difficult to consider the many 
ways in which it would be argued that the mental conditions of claimants are at issue. "); David 
A . Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintiffs Mental Health History in an Employment Discrimina ­
tion Case, 16 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 55, 59 (1994); see also Zachary D. Fasman, Taking the 
Plaintiffs Deposition: The Defense Viewpoint, 712 PLI/Lrr 513 (Nov. 2004) . The author advises 
defense attorneys to cover the following in a deposition of a plaintiff in an employment discrimi­
nation claim: 
(40) Where the plaintiff is claiming emotional distress damages, obtain as much infor­
mation as possible about the symptoms which plaintiff claims support emotional dis ­
tress: when they began; how severe they were; how they interfered with his/her normal 
activities; whether they still do, if not, when they ceased to do so; whether they were 
similar in kind or character to anything plaintiff had experienced previously or since. 
(41) When plaintiff initially sought treatment for such ailments, and if the treatment 
was not sought immediately why not. 
(42) Whether plaintiff was suffering from any other problems at or about the time the 
symptoms began, and if so what those events were like in comparison to the trauma 
suffered at the hands of the employer. 
Fasman, supra, at 535. The author further advises defense attorneys to " [i)nquire about the 
existence of alternative stressors (e.g. , a death in the family, marital and family problems, finan ­
cial problems, medical problems) contemporaneous with the alleged stressful events in plaintiffs 
workplace" and to "[i)nquire about pre-existing mental disorders and symptoms of emotional 
distress. This is a crucial area ." 1d. at 539, 541 (emphasis added). As a follow-up to the deposi­
tion, the author continues, " if plaintiff has claimed emotional distress damage and has identified 
medical practitioners, depose them promptly. " 1d. at 537. If the therapist took " notes during the 
sessions ... subpoena the writings." 1d. at 543. But see infra notes 256-284 and accompanying 
text, questioning whether the "alternative sources of emotional distress" basis for discovery of 
psychotherapy records is consistent with basic notions of the law of tort damages. 
38. See, e.g. , McDonald & Kulick, supra note 36, at 271 (emphasizing that defense counsel 
should obtain and provide to an examining psychiatric expert all mental health records, deposi­
tion transcripts, and similar items in advance of the expert's meeting with the plaintiff) . Another 
tool frequently used by defense counsel, particularly in sexual harassment cases, is a compelled 
mental health examination pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al­
though this Article provides a brief analysis of the core issues in Rule 35 disputes, infra at notes 
285- 310 and accompanying text, comprehensive treatment of the scope and application of the 
rule is found elsewhere. See, e.g. , Richard A. Bales & Priscilla Ray, The Availability of Rule 35 
Mental Examinations in Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 REv. LITIG. 1 (1997); Kent D. 
Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: Reexamining 
Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 1268 (1995). 
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eral public.39 The controversies over the psychotherapist-patient priv­
ilege and the discovery of mental health records generally arise in 
those cases where a plaintiff chooses not to offer some or all of her 
mental health treatment records in support of her claims and resists a 
defendant's efforts to obtain such records through discovery. In many 
insta nces in which a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages, a 
plaintiff who has received psychotherapy trea tment fo r such emo­
tional distress will list one or more trea ting therapists as expert wit­
nesses and plan to introduce some or part of her trea tment records as 
evide nce of her e motional distress.40 In o ther cases, however, a plain­
tiff may plan to offer only her own testimony as to the psychological 
impact of the defenda nt 's actions. She may have received mental 
health treatment fo r such distress but could choose not to offer the 
testimony of her treating therapist. The plaintiff also may have been 
in treatment at the time of, or prior to, the incident at the center of the 
litigation, and she may attempt to keep all records of such treatment 
out of the ha nds of the defendant's attorney. 
Where a plaintiff produces her psychotherapy records in discovery, 
she may be asked at her deposition about certain statements she made 
in t reatment, perhaps with a copy of her t herapist's notes in front of 
the deposing attorney. Some of the specific content of the psycho­
therapy records may have relatively low value to the defense attorney 
in terms of proof of the central issues in contention in the case , such as 
liability or the extent of emotional distress damages, but the defense 
attorney may use the records to paint a negative picture of the plain­
tiff o r to cause emba rrassment, thereby improving settlement chances. 
For example, notes of psychotherapy sessions afte r the plaintiff initi­
ates litiga tion may include references to t he plaintiff's feelings about 
39. See Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing plaintiffs' feelings of "violation " 
at having to disclose medical records, especially mental health records, in employment discrimi­
nation cases). 
40. Rodney J . S. Deaton eta!., The Role of the Mental Health Professional in Employment 
Litigat ion , in MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJ URIES, supra note 29, at 50, 58. Indeed, in some 
instances, a plaintiffs attorney may refer her to a therapist for evaluation and treatment so as to 
ensure that the emotional distress is documented and can be proven through a witness other 
than the plaintiff herself. See generally JoN R. ABELE, EMOTIONAL DisTREss: PROVING DAM­
AGES 103-08 (2003) (discussing benefits of offering expert medical testimony in support of 
claims for emotional distress) . 
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the litigation itsel£.4 1 In short, disclosure of such records is of high 
value to defenda nts and correspondingly high cost to plaintiffs.42 
Given the significant value and cost associated with the disclosure 
of records from psychotherapeutic treatment in civil litiga tion, it is not 
surprising that, as psychotherapy became more widespread and the 
availability of emotional distress damages expanded in fede ral courts, 
t he controversies over the role of such records in civil litigation be­
came increasingly common. As discussed in the next section, due 
largely to the efforts of psychotherapists and psychiatrists to receive 
protection for their professional communications, state legislatures 
and later t he federal courts fashio ned a new privilege to limit the dis­
41. For example, in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw , 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007), the 
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to preclude the introduction into evidence at trial on her Fam­
ily and Medical Leave Act claim certain statements she had made to her therapist to the effect 
that she was " unhappy with her attorney who told her he didn't want to be used as a tool for her 
revenge. " Jd. at 820. The defendant's attorney argued in response to the plaintiff's objection: 
"She's depressed, it makes reference to her mood, and we're entitled to explore and argue any­
thing that would have [an) impact on her mood." Jd. at 820-21. The appeals court affirmed the 
trial court's admission of the record on the basis that she had waived her psychotherapist-patient 
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages. Jd. at 821. The court concluded that the trial 
court's admissibility analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 was "reasonable." I d.; see also 
Murray v. Bd. of Educ. , 199 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring plaintiff in an employ­
ment discrimination case to disclose those portions of her psychotherapist's notes that revealed 
references to and communications with her attorney in that case). 
42. In addition to these factors, other consequences may flow from the release of psychother­
apy records in litigation. There is a real risk, which likely cannot be quantified or proven, that a 
fact finder would use such evidence impermissibly at trial to judge a plaintiffs character, credi­
bility, or likeability. There is little question that stigma, discrimination, and prejudice against 
people with mental illness continue to pervade American society. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, T HE 
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY o N TRIAL 21- 24, 39-43 (2000) (describing the nature 
and pervasiveness of sanism); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITlES ACT 5 (2001) 
("Social science research confirms that ment al illness is one of the most- if not the most­
stigmatized of social conditions."); Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental 
Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEo. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) ("Social discrimination against 
people with mental illness is widespread.") . What is far from certain, however, is what impact 
these factors may have on juror decision making. See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BoRNSTEIN, 
DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PsYCHOLOGY oF J u RY AwARDS 52 (2003). The authors note: 
Data are especially paltry on the effects of plaintiff characteristics on noneconomic 
damages (related to intangibles such as the plaintiffs physical and mental distress, pain 
and suffering, loss of consortium, etc.) despite the fact that there are significant hori­
zontal inequities in compensation for these losses . . . . [N)o studies have examined how 
jurors perceive the amount of pain and suffering experienced by different kinds of 
plaintiffs and how they translate those perceptions into a judgment about 
compensation. 
Id.; see Edith Greene et al., Juror Decisions about Damages in Employ ment Discrimination 
Cases, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 107, 108 (1999) ("Whether juries are competent to make reasonable 
assessments of claims for lost wages and pain and suffering in age and other discrimination cases 
is unknown."). 
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closure of such records.43 However, as discussed in Part IV , this tool 
is of limited effect as federal courts apply a broad conceptualization of 
waiver to the privilege, which e nables defendants ' attorneys to gain 
access to such records in most cases in which the records are sought.44 
III. THE EvoLUTION OF THE P sYCHOTHERAPIST­
pATIE NT PRIVILEGE 
The controversies that surround the psychothe rapist-patient privi­
lege and its application to civil litigation in federal courts trace their 
origins to the development of the privilege itself. The contempora ry 
case law addressing questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege reflects the long-standing resistance to the expansion of testi­
monial privileges first to physicians and later to psychotherapists. In­
deed, as Part IV explains, in many respects, the broad view of waiver 
is simply a reconfiguration of the classic arguments against the 
privilege.45 
A. Origins of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
The psychothe rapist-patient privilege developed in the second half 
of the twentieth century in the face of strong hostility to evidentiary 
privileges in Anglo-American law. Privilege law generally reflects and 
concerns "extrinsic social policy," perhaps more so tha n any other 
realm of evidence.46 While other evidentiary rules aim to improve the 
reliability of evidence, leading to enhanced truth-seeking by fact find­
ers and more efficient trials, privileges provide benefits outside adju­
dication, such as the preservation or protection of certa in 
interpersonal relationships. Such purposes are central to many evi­
dentiary privileges recognized today, including those shielding com­
munications arising in marital, attorney-client, and clergy-believer 
relationships.47 As a result, privileges are antithetical to the primary 
object of evidentia ry trials, as expressed in one of the oft-cited maxims 
in privilege cases: "The public [ ] has a right to every man's 
evidence. "48 
43. See infra notes 69- 132 and accompanying text. 
44. See infra notes 133- 324 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra notes 227- 255 and accompanying text. 
46. EDWARD J. IMWIN KELRIE D , THE N E W WIGMORE: E VIDENTIARY PRIVIL EGES§ 1.1, at 3 
(2002). 
47. Jd. § 1.1, at 4 (noting that numerous witnesses at the Congressional hearings on the pro­
posed federal rules of evidence commented that " unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges pro­
tect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom»). 
48. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U .S. 1, 9 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U .S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
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Few evidentiary privileges were recognized at common law and, 
therefore, sta te legisla tures took the lead in establishing new privi­
leges from the nineteenth century to the present.49 Privilege law often 
reflects a struggle between legisla tures and courts, in which the latter 
ta ke a narrow view of the codified privileges established by the for­
me r.50 Indeed, many privileges- including t he psychothe rapist-pa­
tie nt privilege- came about by intensive lobbying effo rts by 
professionals seeking special status for their communications.51 
Judges resented and resisted restrictions o n their authority to make 
evide ntiary rulings, particularly where the restrictions resulted in the 
exclusion of evidence that was quite often plainly releva nt to the is­
sues before the court. 52 
De an John Henry Wigmore , considered the preeminent American 
evide nce scholar in the ea rly twentieth century, notably opposed the 
wide recognition of evide ntiary privileges.53 Scholars such as Wig­
more, who took a ra tionalist and e mpiricist approach to evidence,54 
expressed skepticism that most privileges were truly necessary as 
mechanisms in social relationships.55 Wigmore questioned any " hu­
manistic rationales" fo r privileges where an empirical basis was lack­
ing.56 That skepticism led him to dismiss most proposed privileges.57 
Wigmore urged courts to take an approach of strict construction to the 
49. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147. 
50. Id. § 3.2.2, at 127. 
51. Jd. at 128. 
52. Jd. 
53. Jd. § 3.1, at 119-22. 
54. Id. § 3.1, at 121, § 3.2.1, at 125. Another early critic of privileges, and one who influenced 
Wigmore's approach, was the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who wrote that privileges 
and other exclusionary rules interfered with the " natural " process of fact finding. Jd. § 2.5, at 
113- 17. He also dismissed the proffered rationales for privileges because there was no empirical 
proof to support them. Id. § 2.5, at 113- 17. As Bentham once stated: " Evidence is the basis for 
justice: exclude evidence and you exclude justice." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF J u DI­
CIAL EVIDENCE 38 (1827). 
55. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.1, at 124-25, § 3.2.3, at 130-31. 
56. Id. § 3.2.1, at 124-25. Wigmore dismissed humanistic rationales as mere " sentiments." Id. 
at 125. 
57. Wigmore developed an influential four -part test for privilege and argued that only a small 
handful of asserted privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, fulfilled the requirements: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte­
nance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedu­
lously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 
8 JoHN HENRY W IGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton 
rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted). 
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new privileges, and courts have generally heeded that suggestion.58 
Wigmore's writings continue to pervade contemporary judicial opin­
ions, as courts note that privileges are disfavored, are to be construed 
strictly, and ultimately impede truth-seeking.s9 
The physician-patient privilege, a forerunner of the psychothera­
pist-patient privilege , was among those privileges that legislatures e n­
acted and courts resisted.60 By the turn of the twentieth century, 
several sta tes had enacted a physician-patient privilege of some 
kind.61 Commentators' criticisms of the new privilege, including those 
by Wigmore himself, were "vociferous."62 One of the most-cited and 
influential attacks on the privilege was that of Harvard Professor 
Z echariah Chaffee, Jr. , who wrote tha t "[s]ecrecy in court is prima 
facie calamitous, and is permissible only when we are very sure that 
frankness will do more harm than good."63 
The sa me year of Chaffee's call for abolition of the physician-pa­
tient privilege, the American Law Institute's Committee on E vidence 
issued a Model Code of E vidence.64 Initial drafts of the Model Code 
contained no provision for a physician-patient privilege, but attorneys 
from jurisdictions that already recognized such privilege lobbied fo r 
its inclusion in the fin al draft.65 The rules provided for several fairly 
broad exceptions to the privilege, including what is now commonly 
referred to as a " patient-litigant exception": 
There is no [physician-patient] privilege ... in an action in which the 
condition of the patient is an eleme nt or factor of the claim or de­
fe nse of th e patient or of any party claiming th rough or under the 
patient or claimi ng as a beneficiary of the patien t th rough a co ntract 
to which the patie nt is or was a party.66 
58. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.2, at 129. 
59. See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Wigmore's four ­
part test in declining to recognize a parent-child privilege). 
60. In 1828, the New York Legislature enacted the first state law codifying a physician-patient 
privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, Vol. n, Part 
III, c-7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73). 
61. 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, fEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE § 5522, at 68 (West 1989). 
62. Id. § 5522, at 70. Many rejected the privilege by employing Wigmore's four conditions, 
essentially an instrumental and utilitarian approach. Id. § 5522, at 76; see also Comment, Waiver 
of a Patient's Privilege, 31 YALE L.J. 529, 529- 30 (1922) (noting that many legislatures have 
enacted such privileges in the face of " much hostile criticism») . 
63. Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by 
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1942) . 
64. MoDEL CoDE Evm. (1942). The code proposed to displace all common law privileges 
with those set out in the model code. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 9. 
65. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 220- 23; 2 MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PsY­
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 269 (1952); see also Chaffee, supra note 63, at 616. 
66. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 223(3). 
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This exception was recognized in ma ny jurisdictions tha t had already 
enacte d the privilege.67 Tying the exception t o the purported instru­
me ntal ra tionale of the privilege itself, Wigmore noted: 
T he who le reason for the privilege is th e patie nt's supposed unwill­
ingness t hat th e ai lme nt s hould be disclosed to the wo rld at large , 
he nce t he bringing of a suit in which t he ve ry d ecla ratio n a nd much 
more the proof discloses t he ailme nt to t he world at la rge is of itself 
a n ind icatio n th at the su pposed re pugnancy to disclosure does no t 
exi st.68 
By mid-century, commenta tors began discussing the need for a sep­
ar ate psychot herapist-patie nt privilege .69 There were two primary im­
petuses fo r the drive fo r a new privilege. First, the physician-patie nt 
privilege, which could apply to psychiat ry, was not uniformly estab­
lished throughou t t he country, notwithstanding its inclusion in the 
Mode l Code. Thus, psychiatrists' ability to avoid testifying was tied to 
t he insecure fate of other medical doctors, as described above.70 Sec­
o nd, and more significantly, courts did not co nsistently apply the phy­
sician-patient privilege to communications arising in psychot herapy. 
Even where a physician-patient privilege was recognized- as was the 
case in approximate ly thirt y states by 1960- questions occasionally 
ar ose regarding whether treatme nt of " mental and e motional disor­
de rs" was in fact " the practice of medicine," triggering t he operation 
of the privilege.71 Further, the field of clinical psychology grew expo­
ne ntially as psychologists began to provide t reatme nt in private prac­
tice in the year s following World War 11.72 That expansion raised the 
question of whether to exte nd the physicia n-patie nt privilege t o e n­
compass non-physicians- such as lice nsed psychologists- o r t o distin­
guish t he physicia n's privilege entirely and establish a new privilege 
based, not upon the status of t he person with whom the communica­
67. Present Status of Medical Privilege, 81 U . PA. L. REv. 755, 762 (1933); MoDEL CoDE 
Evm., supra note 64, at 29. 
68. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2388, at 855, quoted in J EAN V. Mc HALE, MEDICAL CoNFI­
DENTIALITY AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE 111 (1993). 
69. The question of whether there should be a psychotherapist-patient privilege is distinct 
from issues regarding a psychotherapist's duty of confi dentiality, which was already well estab­
lished in ethical rules an d statutes by this time. See DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WErNER, 
THE PsYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL ExAMINATION 11- 24 (1987) . 
70. David Lo uisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II: Confidential Communi ­
calions, 41 MINN. L. REv. 731, 734 (1956). In fact, in New York, the new privilege was limited to 
psychologists and followed the same scope as the state's attorney-client privilege. Jd. 
71. Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and 
the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J . PsYCHOL 733, 735 (1962) (internal q uot ation marks omitted) . 
72. EDWARD SHORTER, A HrsTORY oF PsYCHIATRY: FRoM THE ERA oF THE AsYLUM TO 
THE AGE OF PROZAC 293- 95 (1997); Roderick D. Buchanan, Legis/alive Warriors: American 
Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Competing Claims Over Psychotherapy in the 1950s, 39 J . HrsT. 
BEHAV. Sc1. 225, 228-46 (2003). 
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tions occurred, but upo n the context and nature of the communica­
tions themselves. 
In the years that followe d, two influ ential scholars called fo r the 
widespread recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. In 
1956, Professor David Louisell argued tha t a privilege should be ex­
tended to psychologists ' communications with patie nts in the context 
of providing " psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy."73 Four years 
later, Professor Ralph Slovenko authored a wide ly regarded law re­
view article on the subject urging the recognition of a privilege for 
communications between psychia trists and their patie nts.74 He noted 
that Wigmore had not conside red t he " psychotherapeutic relation­
ship" when he expressed his disapproval of evidentiary privileges and 
that many of t he criticisms leveled at the physician-pa tient privilege 
did not apply to psychia try.75 Referring primarily to psychoa nalytic 
treatment, including free association- which predomina ted the psy­
chotherapy field at that time- Slovenko noted that the psychothera­
peutic relationship "is unique and unlike any other that the patient or 
anyone e lse is likely to encounter ... [as it] bear[s] little resemblance 
to the usual social relationship."76 He concluded: " A privilege for 
those receiving psychotherapy is necessa ry if t he psychiatric profes­
sion is to fulfill its medical responsibility to its patients."77 
In 1960, apparently buoyed by Professor Slovenko's arguments, the 
fie ld of psychiatry launched a full campaign for the enactment of the 
psychiatrist-pa tient privilege.78 The American Psychia tric Associa­
tion's Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) issued a re­
port outlining its argument for recognition of the privilege. The 
report set fort h a classic instrumental rationale for the privilege: 
" [T]here is wide agreement tha t confidentiality is a sine qua non fo r 
73. Louisell, supra note 70, at 7~5. 
74. Ralph Slovenko, Psychialry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNEL. REv. 
175 (1960) . 
75. Jd. at 185, 199. 
76. Id. at 185. He also noted the " difference of language between the inner and outer world " 
and that there is a " higher degree of accuracy in data" in the latter. Jd. at 194. See also 
SHORTER, supra note 72, at 146 (noting that by the mid-20th century, " [i]n the mind of the 
public, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis became virtually synonymous") ; SHUMAN & WEINER, 
supra note 69, at 34 (noting that the basis for the instrumental or utilitarian rationale for the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is rooted in the psychoanalytic model of psychotherapy and its 
emphasis on " total disclosure by patient to therapist") . 
77. Slovenko, supra note 74, at 199. Interestingly, by 1974, Professor Slovenko had apparently 
reversed course on the psychotherapist-patient privilege and concluded that, because the great 
number of exceptions carved into the privilege " leav[es]little or no shield cover," the privilege 
should be abolished. Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture 
of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U . L. REv. 649, 649, 673 (1974). 
78. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5522, at 89. 
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successful psychiatric treatment."79 Thus, the psychiatrists argued, ab­
sent a guarantee tha t the words exchanged with their patients could 
not become evidence in a courtroom, patients could not fully e njoy 
the potential benefits of their treatme nt.80 The " model statute" pro­
posed in the GAP report followed essentially the same approach that 
had been adopted with respect to psychologists in six states81 in prior 
years: to extend to communications between psychiatrists and pa­
tients the same privilege recognized for communications between at­
torneys and their clients.82 Where exceptions or waivers applied to 
the attorney-client privilege, the same approach would be taken with 
the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 
The followi ng year, Connecticut became the first state to consider 
adopting the GAP proposal. A committee convened by the state 
branch of the American Psychiatric Association offered the Connecti­
cut Legislature a bill that was more detailed and did not tie the scope 
of the privilege to the attorney-client privilege.83 Thereafter, the Con­
necticut statute, rather than the GAP proposal, served as a model psy­
chotherapist-patient privilege.84 By the end of the decade, at least 
four other states had enacted statutes based upon Connecticut's 
statute.85 
The Connecticut statute was the first psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege to expressly include a patient-litigant exception. The statute pro­
vided that there would be no privilege "in a civil proceeding in which 
79. Preliminary Draft ofProposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and 
Magistrates, 46 F .R.D. 161, 260 (1969) (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIA­
TRY, REPORT No. 45: CoNFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE 
oF PsYCHIATRY 92 (1960)). 
80. See also RoBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAw AND MENTAL HEALTH: 
A CASE-BASED APPROACH 70 (2006) ("Confidentiality forms the foundation upon which suc­
cessful mental health services stand.»). 
81. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington had enacted stat­
utes providing communications between a psychologist and client the same degree of protection 
as those between an attorney and client. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735 n.8. 
82. Id. at 735. The language of the GAP's model statute read, in its entirety: "The confiden­
tial relationship and communication between the psychiatrist and patient shall be placed on the 
same basis as regards privilege, as provided by Jaw between attorney and client.» Id. at 736. 
83. Id. ("The GAP statute suggest[ed) a host of problems which ca11 into question the appro­
priateness of the attorney-client model. ") . 
84. Paul Frederic Slawson, Patient-Litigant Exception: A Hazard to Psychotherapy, 21 
ARCHIVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY 347, 349 (1969). Georgia had enacted a statute that provided 
some level of protection to psychiatrists. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735. It provided 
simply: "There are certain admissions and communications excluded from consideration of pub­
lic policy. Among those are . . . [p]sychiatrists and patient.» Jd. at 735 n.7 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
85. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349 (Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and Maryland). In 1967, Cali­
fornia enacted another influential psychotherapist-patient privilege statute as part of its new 
evidence code. Jd. 
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the patient introduces his mental condition as an e le ment of his claim 
or defense . . . [if] the judge finds that it is more importa nt to the 
interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the 
relationship between patient and psychiatrist be protected."86 While 
this language was somewhat similar to tha t in the Model Code 's physi­
cian-patient privilege,87 the psychiatrists convinced the Connecticut 
Legislature to include additional language enabling the trial court to 
uphold the privilege even where the pa tient "introduce[d] his mental 
condition as an element of his claim or defense."88 Under the Con­
necticut law, it was the burde n of the party seeking disclosure of the 
confidential communications to de monstra te tha t the "interests of jus­
tice" outweighed the need to protect the psychotherapist-patie nt 
relationship.89 
The inclusion of patient-litigant exceptions in the statutory psycho­
therapist-patie nt privileges did not genera te much, if any, debate dur­
ing enactment of these early privileges.90 However, in 1969, as states 
rapidly enacted specific psychotherapist-pa tient privileges that con­
tained patient-litigant exceptions, one psychiatrist, Paul Frederic Slaw­
son, published a critique of the exception as applied to 
communications arising in psychotherapy.91 While initially the excep­
tion "seems reasonable and consona nt with our sense of fair play," he 
noted, " [o]n second look, the words of the pa tient-litiga nt exception 
fall out of sha rp focus. "92 Slawson questioned the notion of a pa tient's 
" mental or emotional condition" as being an easily ascertainable con­
struct.93 He also argued that what is revealed in psychotherapy notes 
"is prone to distortion and consistently invites misundersta nding" and 
therefore offers little " pertinent informa tion. "94 He went so fa r as to 
86. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737. Although the Connecticut statute has undergone 
significant revision since its enactment, the essential language of that exception remains in effect 
to this date. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-146c(c)(2) (psychologists), 146f(5) (psychiatrists) 
(West & West Supp. 2008). A few other state statutes set forth similar balancing language today. 
740 I LL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10(2) (West 2007) (exception applies only where a court deter­
mines that " disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection 
from any injury which disclosure is likely to cause"); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(c) 
(West 2000). 
87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
88. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737. 
89. Jd. 
90. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349. 
91. Id. at 350-52. However, Slawson thought that such exception " makes sense" in the physi­
cian-patient context. Jd. 
92. Jd. at 350. 
93. Jd. at 350-51. He was especially concerned about the abuse of the exception in divorce 
proceedings. Jd. 
94. Jd. at 351. 
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assert that a psychiatric diagnosis " may be no more than the product 
of a feeble inductive attempt made to satisfy administrative or actua­
rial needs. "95 "Lawyers," he reasoned, "want facts and psychiatrists 
can do remarkably well without them."96 
Dr. Slawson's cautions apparently made no impact. By 1996, all 
states had codified some kind of psychotherapist-patient privilege ei­
ther by statute or court rule,97 and each contained a patient-litigant 
exception, either through a specific provision in the codification of the 
rule or through a court ruling. 98 
95. Jd. at 352. 
96. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352. 
rn. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n .11 (1996) (citing statutes and rules for aliSO states and 
the District of Columbia). The Uniform Rules of Evidence were amended in 1fJ74 to be nearly 
identical to the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, including the rejected psychothera­
pist-patient privilege referenced infra at note 99. UN!F. R. Evm. 503 (1fJ74), 13C U.L.A. 324-25 
(2004); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.3, at 237, § 4.3.1, at 242-43. The Uniform Rules were 
again amended in 1999. See UN!F. R. Evm. 503 (amended 1999), 13A U .L.A . 91- 92 (2004). The 
Uniform Rules created a single " Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege" with the pro­
visions extending the privilege to all physicians in brackets. I d. The current version of the Uni­
form Rule sets forth a patient-litigant exception that is essentially identical to that in rejected 
Rule 504, and provides that the privilege does not apply to any communication: 
relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental(,] or emotional condition of the patient in 
any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the 
patient's claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any 
party relies upon the condition as an element of the party's claim or defense. 
UNIF. R. Evm. 503(d)(3). 
98. See BARBARA A . WErNER & RoBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL IssuES IN MENTAL HEALTH 
CARE 213 (1993); Daniel A. Cantu, Comment, When Should Federal Courts Require Psychother­
apists to Testify About Their Patients? An Interpretation of Jaffee v. Redmond, 1998 U . CHI. 
LEGAL F. 375, 383 n.73. There is significant variation among the states in terms of the scope and 
operation of the patient-litigant exception. Some state statutes delineate in which kinds of pro­
ceedings the privilege may or may not operate. For example, some states have specific excep­
tions for child custody proceedings. Nat'l Conf. of Comm 'rs. of Uniform State Laws, Uniform 
Rules of Evidence 503 (1997 draft), at 2, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllarchives/ulc. 
htm/uldurelev503.pdf; see, e.g. , MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e) (West 2000) . A sub­
stantial number of statutes provide that the exception does not apply in workers compensation 
cases. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL, T ESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES§ 7:23 (3d ed. 2005, updated 
2007) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2380 n.6) . Others place medical malpractice cases, by 
contrast, squarely within the exception. Jd.; see Mo. CooE ANN., CTs. & J u o. PRoc. § 9­
109(d)(4) (LexisNexis 2006). And at least one state, Michigan, frames its exception so that if a 
party asserts the privilege during discovery, he is foreclosed from offering evidence at trial on his 
condition. Mic H. CT. R. 2.314(B)(2) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, if a party asserts that 
the medical information is subject to a privilege and the assertion has the effect of preventing 
discovery of medical information otherwise discoverable ... the party may not thereafter present 
. . . any . .. evidence relating to the party's medical history or . . . condition."). Thus, rather than 
finding a waiver of the privilege, the rule provides that invocation of the privilege operates to 
limit the admissibility of evidence offered at trial by the plaintiff. 
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B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts 
The development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the 
federal courts took a markedly different route from tha t in the states. 
In contrast to the sta tes' statutory privileges , federal privilege law con­
tinues to develop through the common law. E ven after enacting the 
Federal Rules of E vidence in 1975 , Congress left it to the courts to 
de termine which, if any, privileges would be recognized in all but strict 
diversity jurisdiction cases, based upon judges' own " reason and expe­
rience."99 The federal courts, however, continue to display a reluc­
tance to recognize privileges. Many heed the cautious language of the 
Supre me Court's 1974 opinion, United States v. Nixon, in which the 
Court rejected a broad view of preside ntial privilege, underscoring 
that privileges " are not lightly created nor expa nsively construed , for 
they are in derogation of the search for truth."100 Until the Supreme 
Court addressed this issue in 1996, federal courts considered the mer­
its and application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on a case­
by-case basis and were sharply divided on whethe r to recognize the 
privilege and on its appropriate contours.101 
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court addressed the psychother­
apist-patie nt privilege in a le thal force civil rights case brought by the 
survivors of Ricky Allen, Sr. against Mary Lu Redmond, a police of­
99. FED. R. Evm. 501. Among the draft federal rules proposed by the Supreme Court were 
several evidentiary privileges, including proposed Rule 504, a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
Rules of Evidence for United Stales Courts and Magistrates, 56 F .R.D. 183, 24~ (1972). The 
commentary noted that CAL. Evro. CoDE§§ 1010-26 (West 2008) and CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 52­
146a (1966 Supp.) served as two of the " illustrative statutes" consulted during the proposed 
rule's drafting. !d. at 242. The drafters also concluded that the rationale for such privilege had 
been convincingly stated in the GAP Proposal, supra note 79, as well as in Professor Slovenko's 
article, supra note 74. !d. The proposed privilege included a patent-litigant exception typical of 
that found in many state statutes. The inclusion of the proposed privileges proved extremely 
controversial and Congress removed them from the final enactment. In their place , Congress 
enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 which provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by 
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter­
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How­
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense 
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance 
with State law. 
FED. R. Evm. 501; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence on Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The 
Strength of the lngroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REv. 41 (2006). 
100. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
101. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996). 
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ficer who shot and killed Allen when responding to a report of a 
fight.102 Plaintiffs' counsel learned during discovery that, after the 
shooting, Redmond had participated in approximately fifty counseling 
sessions with a social worker employed by the municipality.103 The 
plaintiffs' attorneys sought the records in discovery "for use in cross­
examining Redmond,"104 most likely because they hoped that such 
records would contain valuable admissions about the incident such as 
statements of guilt or remorse, or a description of the events at vari­
ance with others Redmond had provided. Redmond' s attorneys and 
counselor refused to produce the counseling records or to permit wit­
nesses to respond to questions regarding the counseling sessions, de­
spite court orders compelling disclosure.105 As a sanction, the trial 
court instructed the jury that they could make an adverse inference 
about the content of the records since there was "no legal justifica­
tion " for the refusal to produce them.106 The court e ntered judgment 
for plaintiffs on the jury's verdict of $545,000.to7 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.108 The 
panel concluded that Evidence Rule SOl's " reason and experience" 
standard led to the conclusion that the federal common law should 
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.109 However, in lan­
guage echoing the standard first seen in the 1960 Connecticut stat­
ute,110 the panel also noted that the privilege would not apply where 
" in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of 
the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs the patient's 
privacy interests."111 The court concluded that the privilege should be 
recognized in that case based upon the minimal probative value of the 
therapy records as compa red with Redmond 's substa ntial privacy in­
terests.112 Noting that the circuit courts were divided on the issue of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege (two had recognized the privi­
102. Jd. at 4. 
103 . Jd. at 5. 
104. Jd. 
105. Jd. 
106. Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 6. 
108. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), affd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) . 
109. Jd. at 1355- 56. 
110. CoN N . GEN. STAT. A N N . § 52-146 (1966 Supp.); see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
111. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357. 
112. Jd. at 1358. 
100 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79 
lege,113 while four rejected it114), the Supreme Court granted certio­
rari and affirmed. u 5 
In recognizing the psychothe rapist-patient privilege, the Court re­
lied almost exclusively on an instrumental rationale. Justice Stevens 
noted that the privilege is " ' rooted in the imperative need for confi­
dence and trust,' "116 since "effective psychotherapy" requires a pa­
tient to be "willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts , 
emotions, memories, and fears."117 The psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege would also "serve public ends,"118 because the "mental health of 
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of tran­
scendent importance."119 The majority contrasted these benefits with 
the merely "modest" evide ntiary benefit if the re were no privilege. 
" Without a privilege," the Court reasoned, " much of the desirable evi­
dence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into 
being."120 The majority also gave great weight to the fact tha t, by this 
point in time, " all 50 States and the District of Columbia have e nacted 
into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."tzt 
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Seventh 
Circuit, it tinkered with the lower court's conceptualization of the 
privilege. Specifically, it rejected the " balancing" approach employed 
by the panel and instead recognized the privilege as absolute.122 The 
Court incorporated and applied the reasoning first articulated in 
Upjohn Co. v. United Statest23; 
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in 
the con fi de ntial conversation " must be able to predict with some 
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. 
An uncertain privilege , o r one which purports to be certain but re­
113. In re Doe, %4 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983). 
114. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 863 (1994); 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United 
States, 493 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
489 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 853 (1976). 
115. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7, 18 (1996). 
116. Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U .S. 40, 51 (1980)) (discussing the attor­
ney-client privilege). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 11. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 12. 
121. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 12. 
122. Id. at 17- 18. 
123. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U .S. 383 (1981). 
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suits in widely varyi ng applications by the courts, is little better than 
no privilege at all . " 124 
The Court did not suggest what circumsta nces would give rise to a 
waiver of the privilege; it simply acknowledged in a footnote: " Like 
other tes timonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the pro­
tection."125 In a separa te footnote, the Court also acknowledged that 
there could be occasions where the privilege would need to "give 
way," such as "if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others 
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist. "126 
Commentators have noted that Jaffee appea rs to be an aberration 
when compared with the general hostility of the federal courts, includ­
ing the Supreme Court, to the recognition of privileges.127 Professor 
Imwinke lried reasons that the "extraordinary fact pattern[,]a highly 
plausible instrumental argument ... [and] unanimous support for the 
privilege among the states" led to the result in Jaffee.128 H owever, 
the decision did not silence the critics of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, and Justice Scalia's dissent reflects many of their criti­
cisms.129 Notably, contemporary commentators and researchers con­
tinue to question the instrumental rationale upon which the privilege 
is based.130 Nonetheless, the holding of Jaffee established a psycho­
124. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393) . 
125. Id. at 15 n.14. 
126. Id. at 18 n.19. 
127. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.2.4, at 229. 
128. Id. at 231. 
129. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22- 25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking aim at the instrumental rationale, 
among other things). 
130. For a discussion of the various rationales offered and questioned with respect to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, see generally SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 39, 25-43 
("There is substantial disagreement about the extent of confidentiality required for effective 
therapy . . . . The question of the relationship between patients' complete openness and the 
quality of their treatment has yet to be established.»). The authors conducted a series of empiri­
cal studies to test the instrumental rationale and concluded that, "while confidentiality is impor­
tant in therapeutic relationships, privilege is not." Id. at 113. They also noted, however, that 
"(t)he deontological argument for a psychotherapist-patient privilege, frequently ignored by the 
privilege's proponents in common law jurisdictions, is persuasive both on its own terms and as a 
vehicle for avoiding the quagmire created by the assumptions underlying the utilitarian argu­
ments.» Id. at 135. 
For an excellent analysis and critique of the Court's application of the instrumental rationale 
in Jaffee, see Edward J . Imwinkelried, The Rivalry between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of 
the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) , 49 HAS­
TINGS L.J. 969 (1998). See also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 503-08; Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the 
Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 145 (2004); Edward J. l mwinkelried, A Psy ­
chological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights 
from the Literature on Self-Disclosure , 38 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 707 (2004) . Professor lmwinkelried 
notes that the purported empirical support for the rationale does not hold up under scrutiny. 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 507. He suggests a preferable rationale he refers to as 
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therapist-patient privilege that was to be recognized and e nforced in 
the context of litigation, without regard to the principles with which 
courts generally concern the mselves during discovery disputes such as 
relevance, necessity, and fairness to the party seeking discovery of 
privileged communications.131 H owever, in the yea rs since the opin­
ion, the Supre me Court' s absolute privilege has emerged as one that is 
truly " uncertain"132 and ultimately illusory. 
IV. IMPLIED WAIVER oF THE PsYCH OTHERAPIST -PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS 
While Jaffee answered the basic questions that had previously di­
vided federal courts-whether the re should be a federal psychothera­
pist-patient privilege, to which professions should it apply, and 
whether the privilege should be absolute-the most common question 
in federal courts regarding the enforcement of the privilege did not 
arise in that case. Namely, under what circumstances should a court 
decline to e nforce the privilege where doing so would limit a defen­
dant 's ability to access records and testimony tha t may be relevant to 
a plaintiffs claim? The federal courts have generally framed the issue 
as whether a plaintiff's allegations and claims have resulted in an im­
plied "waiver" of the psychotherapist-patient privilege such tha t the 
psychotherapy records are subject to discovery. H owever, the case 
law on this issue generates more questions than answers. 
A. A Problem of Terminology: "Waiver" Versus " Exception" 
When considering the approaches to waiver of the psychotherapist­
patient privilege in federal courts, courts and codifiers are inexact and 
inconsistent with their terminology. What developed in the state leg­
islatures as the " patient-litigant exception" to the psychothe rapist-pa­
tient privilege-where the patie nt has somehow injected his or her 
mental condition into litigation she may not simultaneously assert the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to limit discovery of any records of 
such mental condition- emerged in the federal courts in the terminol­
ogy of the " in issue," or " at issue" waiver of the privilege.133 In both 
the " humanistic rationale," which is based upon core democratic principles of privacy and auton­
omy. !d. at 509. While some existing privileges do not pass muster under that rationale, Profes­
sor Imwinkelried concludes that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would serve such 
principles. !d. at 509-12. 
131. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 17- 18. 
132. !d. at 18. 
133. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 873-85. The notion of an issue-driven waiver 
is not unique to the psychotherapist-patient privilege but can arise in the context of the attorney­
client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, among others. !d. 
103 2008] PS Y CH OTH E RAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
contexts, the privilege holder is unable to resist discovery requests fo r 
me ntal health information, but quite different terms are used to de­
scribe t he mechanism that brings about such result.l34 
Commenta tors analyzing the general concept of "waiver" consist­
ently e mphasize the central roles of intentionality and voluntariness as 
indispensible preconditions for a finding of waiver.135 Professor Jes­
sica Wilen Berg noted tha t the requirement of "intention" contains 
the corresponding requirement that " the actor must unde rstand the 
act and its consequences. "136 Similarly, Professor Edwa rd Rubin ob­
served that the most " general " definition of waiver is "a decision not 
to exercise a right, or, more precisely, a judicial finding t hat a person 
has lost a right as a result of his decision. "137 R ubin argued that, since 
one could argue that someone waived his right to liberty by commit­
ting a crime, to effectuate a waiver the decision must be "directly re­
lated to t he right in question."138 Thus, each of t hese formulations 
looks to an affirma tive act by an individual holding a legal right to 
de termine if the individual has waived her right. Indeed, this fra me­
work calls into question the very notion of an "implied" waiver and 
suggests that the concept should be applied with caution.139 
In America n law, a testimonial privilege is a legal right that, once 
held, can be waived, and t he general terminology and conceptualiza­
tion of waiver, therefore , apply as they would to other rights that a 
person may waive.140 Generally, waiver of a privilege is a failure to 
assert the privilege at a juncture where one would be expected to do 
so, such as through voluntary disclosure, or a failure to object to dis­
closure in other phases of litigation.1 4 1 The law recognizes both im­
plied and actual waivers of privileges by a wide ra nge of actions, 
134. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543, at n.39. 
135. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 Hou s. L. REv. 281, 306-07 (2003) 
(describing these requir ements as: "voluntariness (freedom from controUing interference) and 
intention to act (which includes knowledge and capacity)»); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General 
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 48!W!3 (1981). 
136. Berg, supra note 135, at 314. 
137. Rubin , supra note 135, at 483. Rubin disputed that intention and knowledge are merely 
" criteria by which the quality of a particular decision can be judged. " !d. 
138. !d. at 484. 
139. Similarly, Slawson, in arguing the privilege should only be set aside where there is a 
waiver by the patient, noted that the concept of waiver " implies fuU knowledge and understand­
ing of what is being waived " and " awareness of the consequences of [such] disclosure." Slawson, 
supra note 84, at 351. He suspected that patients in fact have little understanding of what is in 
their psychiatrists' notes and charts. !d. 
140. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 842. 
141. See, e.g. , 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C KIRKPATRICK, f EDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 5:11 (3d ed. 2007). 
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inclu ding by execution of releases of information,142 by contract,143 
and by disclosure to third parties.144 The assumption is t hat any such 
act is " an autonomous choice by t he holder" of the privilege.145 This 
approach is reflected in the specific section o n waiver set forth in re­
jected Federal R ule of E vide nce 511 and similar provisions in the u ni­
form and model rules under which "waiver" occu rs only t hrou gh 
voluntary disclosu re or consent to othe rs' disclosure of t he privileged 
communication.146 
The term " exception" as applied to privileges, such as the "danger­
ous patient" or "crime frau d " exceptions to t he psychothe rapist-pa­
tie nt privilege, generally limits the privilege based upon t he content of 
t he communication, su ch as a threat to do harm to others.147 In these 
insta nces, t he privilege is rega rded as never attaching to t he communi­
cation. By contrast, t he concept of waiver is more appropriately con­
sidered after the fact of the confidential communication, o nce the 
privilege and the accompanying rights of enforcement have at­
tached.148 Thus, a patient may enjoy t he privilege for an extended 
142. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 853. 
143. Jd. 
144. Jd. at 859. 
145. Jd. at 843; see also id. § 6.12.4, at 877 (noting that filing a pleading containing an allega­
tion concerning the substance of confidential communications is " an affirmative act placing the 
issue[s] in dispute" which may trigger the "at issue" waiver doctrine of privileges). 
146. For example, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides, in the section titled " Waiver of 
Privilege": 
(a) Voluntary disclosure. A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against 
disclosure waives the privilege if the person or the person's predecessor, while holder 
of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of 
the privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. 
(b) Involuntary disclosure. A claim of privilege is not waived by a disclosure that was 
compelled erroneously or made without an opportunity to claim the privilege. 
UNtF. R u LES Evm. 510, 13A U.L.A. 100 (2004); see also Rules of Evidence for United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F .R.D. 183, 258-59 (1972) (setting forth text of Proposed Rule 511, 
upon which Uniform Rule Sll(a) is based). 
147. Some federal courts and several state evidence rules recognize a so-called "crime-fraud " 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory 
P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts are divided on the so-called "dangerous 
patient" exception. Compare United States v. Glass, 133 F .3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998) (hold­
ing that there may be an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege where disclosure is 
the only means to avoid harm), with United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991- 92 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en bane) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception), and United States v. Hayes, 
227 F.3d 578, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception in 
criminal cases) . See also Orenstein, supra note 17, at 687 (questioning why the courts struggling 
with the dangerous patient exception did not consider whether the communications would fall 
under the crime-fraud exception). 
148. Cf. Comment, supra note 62, at 530-31 (noting that the physician-patient privilege "con­
fers a power on the patient" which can be either exercised or waived only by the patient 
himself). 
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period of time- even decades- before some subsequent action by the 
pa tient, such as executing a release, vitiates the privilege.149 This dis­
tinction appears in Jaffee , where Justice Stevens notes, " [l]ike other 
testimonial privileges , the patient may of course waive the protec­
tion,"150 and "we do not doubt that there are situations in which the 
privilege must give way. " 1 5 1 Thus, in a case in which the privilege at 
issue is framed in broad terms, the Court itself appears to be ma king a 
distinction between "waiver," which is premised on actions by the pa­
tient, and exceptions to the privilege itself which turn on the 
"situation. "152 
This variation in terminology with respect to t he same mecha nism is 
significa nt because it may serve as one explanation of federal courts ' 
failure to approach t he question as one truly concerning a "waiver," as 
that general concept is understood and applied in the law.153 As 
noted above, the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege in the sta tes is 
largely a creature of statute or rule. Following the Model Code, the 
revised U niform Rules of Evidence, and the early Connecticut and 
California statutes, a significant number of sta tes include a " patient­
litigant exception" in t he privilege's codification.154 In the fe de ral 
courts, the term " patie nt-litigant exception" is essentially absent from 
the federal common law of the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege. 
H owever, the same reasoning unde rlying the exception in state courts 
is now seen in the analysis of implied waiver in federal courts, as dis­
cussed below.155 
The unde rlying principles of waiver, in whatever context, require 
courts, when determining whether there has been a waiver, to focus 
exclusively on the knowledge, decisions, and actions of the holde r of 
the right allegedly waived. Considera tions such as the potential bene­
149. Professor Slovenko suggested that the distinction should be between waiver and " termi­
nation" of the privilege and that the latter is a more accurate description of the operation of 
filing suit in which a patient's mental or emotional condition is at issue and that "the term 
'waiver' ought to apply only in the situation where the patient voluntarily gives up his privilege 
and requires the physician to testify." RALPH SwvENKo, PsYCHOTHERAPY, CoNFIDENTIALITY, 
AND PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATION 155 (1966) . 
150. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996) (emphasis added). 
151. Jd. at 18 n.19 (emphasis added). 
152. See also SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 7 (drawing a distinction between whether 
the privilege is " waived by the patient" and exceptions to the privilege). Thus, the state law 
" patient-litigant exception" could be considered a misnomer. 
153. See 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n.44 (noting that applying the concept 
of "waiver" to the patient-litigant exception " distort[s] the waiver doctrine"). 
154. See Cantu, supra note 98, at 383 n.73 (referring to specific statutes or court rules, rather 
than limitations emerging from court decisions, "[t]wenty-nine states provide no privilege for 
information raised as evidence for a claim or defense") . 
155. See infra notes 156-324 and accompanying text. 
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fits flowing to others if the right is not e nforced, while useful and im­
porta nt when determining a privilege's exceptions and limitations at 
the time of its initial construction, have no place in the analysis of 
waiver. However, as the review of the case law below reveals , the 
general principles that apply to the questions of waiver of rights are 
largely absent from the analysis of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa­
tie nt privilege in federal courts. The decisions too infreque ntly con­
sider the plaintiffs actions and choices in direct relation to the right 
allegedly waived. Indeed, most federal courts are not in fact trea ting 
the issue of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a 
question of waiver at all. 
B. The Federal Courts' Approach to Waiver 
The case law concerning waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege revolves around a basic question with a very complex answer: 
What does it mea n to place one's " mental condition" in issue such that 
it effectuates a waiver of the privilege? In Jaffee , the Court addressed 
the existence of the privilege in one of the very rare cases in which a 
court considered the privilege without also grappling with the concept 
of waiver, because it was a defendant asserting the privilege in that 
case.156 After previously denying certiorari in at least five cases where 
the existence of the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege was squa rely at 
issue, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the privilege question 
in a case with no waiver issue.157 Since Jaffee , the Supreme Court has 
been squarely presented with the issue of the appropriate approach to 
questions arising under the "at issue" waiver, but has declined, as re­
cently as 2007, to grant certiorari on such issue.158 Indeed , as was the 
case with t he privilege itself prior to Jaffee , courts are left stumbling 
along, trying to fashion a rule on a case-by-case basis.159 
156. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 5-6. 
157. Jd. at 7. 
158. In Doe v. Oberwei.s Dairy , 127 S. a. 1815 (2007), the Court denied a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Doe v. 
Oberwei.s Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006), discussed infra at note 183 and accompanying text. 
Plaintiff-appellant phrased the question presented for review as follows: 
Under what cir cumstances does a Plaintiff in a Title VII case, who seeks compensatory 
damages under Title VII for emotional distress, waive the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege that this Court recognized in Jaffee? Guidance is needed to resolve the split in the 
circuit courts and in the more than sixty district courts that have reported their 
decisions. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, D o e, 127 S. a. 1815 (No. 06-735). 
159. One should always be cautious when drawing generalizations about what happens in liti­
gation, including discovery, based upon written opinions that find their way into official report­
ers or electronic databases. Given the state of the case Jaw, or ignorance of it, plaintiffs' counsel 
may not challenge defense attorneys' attempts to obtain counseling records, or to take the depo­
107 2008] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
1. "Broad" Versus "Narrow" Approaches to Waiver 
Nearly all of the discussion and analysis of waiver of the psycho­
therapist-patient privilege divide the judicial approaches into two 
camps: broad and narrow.16° Courts that take a broad approach to 
waiver are less scrutinous of a defendant's assertion that there has 
been a waiver and are more likely to order disclosure of psychother­
apy records.161 By contrast, those taking the narrow, minority ap­
proach162 are more likely to deny disclosure by finding that a 
plaintiff's actions in the litigation fell short of that required to effectu­
ate a waiver.163 However, the procedural posture of the cases, the 
rationales applied by the courts, and other factors reveal that the case 
law cannot be analyzed and critiqued using this simple dichotomy.164 
The "broad approach" label generally applies to cases in which 
courts find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege based 
solely upon a plaintiff's assertion of a nonspecific claim for emotional 
distress, though the plaintiff has not offered the testimony of an ex­
pert psychological witness to support her claim.165 Courts adopting a 
more narrow approach will usually decline to find a waiver unless the 
plaintiff has listed her psychotherapist as a witness for trial or other­
wise proposed to place the privileged communications directly or indi­
rectly in issue.I66 
sition of a current or former treating psychotherapist. If there is a discovery dispute, it is likely 
that it would not result in a reported decision, but rather would be resolved through a telephonic 
conference with a federal magistrate judge. See FED. R. C.v. P. 37(a)(3). Thus, one can assume 
that in a significant number of federal civil rights actions in which the plaintiff's psychiatric his­
tory is sought, any controversy regarding discovery of mental health treatment is unknown to 
those outside of the proceedings. Cf Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimi­
nation, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927, 927 (2006) (noting that the prevalence of confidential settlements in 
workplace discrimination claims "skews empirical studies of discrimination litigation"). None­
theless, there are a sufficient number of written decisions addressing implied waiver of the psy­
chotherapist-patient privilege to provide a good indication of how the question is generally 
framed and addressed in the courts. 
160. See generally Aronson, supra note 10, at 605- 07; McDonnell, supra note 10, at 1370. 
161. See, e.g. , Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001) . 
162. See, e.g. , Cohen v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-6780, 2007 WL 2789272, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007). 
163. See, e.g. , Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R. D. 526, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
164. See Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R. D. 551, 556 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("This Court 
. . . has found that, upon close inspection, many of the cases purporting to reject the narrow view 
and adopt a broad view actually take a middle ground."). 
165. See, e.g. , Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F .3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. 
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006); Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No . 1:06-CV-211, 2007 
WL 3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007); E EOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No. 
8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007); Manessis v. New York City Dep't of 
Tr ansp., No. 02 CIV. 359SASDF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N .Y. Sept. 24, 2002). 
166. See, e.g. , Barnett v. PA Consulting Group Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at *4 
(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007); Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9 
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The leading case under the na rrow approach is Vand erbilt v. Town 
of Chilmark,167 decided the year afte r Jaffee. Drawing o n case law 
analyzing alleged waivers of attorney-client privilege, the Vanderbilt 
court reasoned t hat a waiver results not from the plaintiff raising an 
issue arguably rela ted to her mental health, but rather from offering 
communications with a mental health care provider as evidence in the 
litigation.168 Thus , absent notice t hat the plaintiff intended to call her 
therapist as a witness who would t hen reveal privileged communica­
tions, there could be no waiver.169 Some courts have followed this 
rationale and concluded that, where t he plaintiff has not listed her 
therapist as a potential expert, there has been no waiver of the psy­
cho therapist-patient privilege.170 Simila rly, in cases where a plaintiff 
has listed her t reating psychotherapist as a witness, defendants gener­
ally prevail in their assertions that there has been a waiver of the 
privilege.171 
The approach to waiver taken in Vanderbilt and by courts tha t fol­
low the opinion is generally consistent with the essential principles of 
waiver. The court focused its analysis on whether the privilege­
holder, the plaintiff, had undertaken an act directly related to the priv­
ileged communica tions (i.e. offering t he communications in support of 
her claims) that was plainly inconsistent with an assertion of the privi­
lege such that it ca n be properly regarded as a waiver of the privilege. 
Conside rations such as t he impact on the parties ' positions, the rele­
vance of the information, and notions of fairness play little, if any role , 
in these courts ' de termination of whet her there has been a waiver.172 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006); Greenberg v. Smolka, No . 03 Civ. 8572, 2006 WL 1116521, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639-40 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Allen v. 
Cook County Sheriff's Dep't , No. 97 C 3625, 1999 WL 168466, at *2 (N.D. l11. Mar. 17, 1999) . 
167. Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997). 
168. Id. at 228-29; see also Hucko , 185 F.R. D. at 529 (drawing similar analogy to waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege and concluded that there was no waiver because the plaintiff did not 
plan to offer evidence of " prior consultations with psychotherapists in order to prove his claim of 
emotional harm"). 
169. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229. 
170. See Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534 (E.D. 
Ark. Sept. 21 2006); Kunstler, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9; Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639; cf. United 
States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d. 1187, 1190 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the defendant was not 
entitled to discover the victim's counseling records when victim did not intend to discuss the 
" content of her counseling sessions" at the sentencing hearing). 
171. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Colo. 2004); Adams v. Ardcor, 
196 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Wise. 2000); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield, 
Inc., 967 F . Supp. 346, 350 (C.D. Ill. 1997) . 
172. See, e.g. , Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. 
Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (" (T]he proper subject for the waiver analysis is whether the substance of a 
particular communication has been placed in issue, not whether the topic of communication is 
relevant to the factual issues of the case."). 
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H owever, the maj ority of courts that have considered the question 
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege have taken a very 
different course.173 Doe v. City ofChula Vista provides an example of 
the re asoning employed by courts taking a broader view of waiver in 
the context of emotional distress claims.174 The opinion is re marka­
ble in two respects: first, it contains a lengthy analysis of the relative 
me rits of the narrow-versus-broad approaches, and second, it reverses 
a magistrate's decision that provided an even lengthier analysis lead­
ing to precisely the opposite conclusion on the same fac ts.175 A for­
me r assistant city attorney filed a claim for discrimination on the basis 
of perceived disability, alleging that her employer terminated her after 
she refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation.176 Pointing to the 
plaintiff's claim for e motional distress damages, the defendants sought 
documents of "each and every mental and psychological disorder" for 
which the plaintiff had sought treatment in the previous ten yea rs.177 
The discovery dispute was presented to the magis trate judge who, af­
ter reviewing the case law, found the " narrow view" to be more per­
suasive.178 Nonetheless, the magistrate ordered the disclosure of the 
names of healthcare providers who treated the plaintiff within the pre­
vious year and permitted the defendants to inquire into other "events 
and circumstances" in the plaintiff's life to determine if there were any 
other potential causes of e motional distress.179 
In response to the defendants' objection to the magistrate judge's 
ruling, the district court significantly broadened the information to 
which the defendants could have access. The judge first reviewed the 
rationales and approaches of the two competing lines of cases regard­
ing waiver and concluded that the United States Supreme Court 
would adopt the broad view of waiver.180 Since the plaintiff there 
sought emotional distress damages, the court concluded, her " emo­
tional health, near the time of the defendants' alleged misconduct, is 
173. Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98 Civ. 9009, 2003 WL 1618530, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 27, 2003). 
174. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The issue arose in an ADA 
case, but because the plaintiff asserted a claim only under the " regarded as" prong of the defini­
tion of disability, and did not allege an actual disability, the ADA claim did not come into play in 
the waiver question. 
175. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
176. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 562. 
177. Jd. at 563. 
178. Fritsch , 187 F.R.D. at 629- 30. 
179. Jd. at 633. 
180. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 568. The court based this conclusion, in part, on the "Court's" (albeit 
through an advisory committee and twenty-five years earlier) inclusion of a patient-litigant ex­
ception in the psychotherapist-patient privilege ultimately rejected by Congress. Jd. 
110 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79 
an issue in the litigation" and she "is relying on her e motional state to 
make her case."18 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff could not shield her psy­
chotherapy records from discovery. 
Several other courts have followed the same basic reasoning of Doe 
v. City ofChula Vista , but few have provided an in-depth discussion of 
the issue. 182 Three federal courts of appeals fo llow the broad ap­
proach, but none has offered close analysis of the controversy in the 
lower courts. In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, writing on behalf of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner noted 
simply, " If a plaintiff by seeking damages for e motional distress places 
his or her psychological sta te in issue, the defendant is entitled to dis­
cover any records of that sta te." 183 Similarly, in Schoffstall v. Hender­
son , the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
had " place[ d] ... her medical condition at issue" by seeking emotional 
distress damages and therefore had waived the psychotherapist-pa­
tient privilege.184 Fmally, in Maday v. Public Libraries ofSaginaw, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that by seeking emo­
tional distress damages, the plaintiff had " put her emotional sta te at 
issue in the case" and therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.Iss 
More recently, two federal appeals courts have indicated that they 
would follow a different approach.186 However, neither court was re­
quired to address squarely the issue of whether a claim for emotional 
distress is a basis for finding a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. In Koch v. Cox, an employment discrimination case in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiff 
chose to withdraw his claim for e motional distress.187 In reversing the 
district court' s finding that the plaintiff had nonetheless waived the 
privilege by acknowledging in discovery responses that he had been 
diagnosed with depression, the panel indicated that it found Vander­
bilt's reasoning more persuasive than the Oberweis Dairy and Schoff­
181. Jd. at 569. 
182. See, e.g. , Waggaman v. Villanova Univ., No. 04-4447, 2006 WL 2045486, at *2 (E. D. Pa. 
July 14, 2006); Manessis v. New York City Dep't of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359, 2002 WL 31115032, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL 
910443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); Calder v. T CI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV­
01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2001); Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 Civ. 9588, 1998 
WL 164823, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998) . 
183. Doe V . Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 s. a. 1815 
(2007). 
184. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) . 
185. Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007). 
186. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384 (D .C. Cir. 2007). 
187. Koch, 489 F.3d at 388. 
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stall decisions, particularly with respect to the Vanderbilt court's 
analogy to the attorney-client privilege.188 The panel noted that, were 
it to follow the broad view of waiver adopted by the district court, it 
would "sub silentio ... overrule" Jaffee, without the authority to do 
so.189 The court reasoned t hat it must "supply a sta ndard for deter­
mining whether a patient has waived the privilege ... t hat does not 
eviscerate the privilege."190 Accordingly, the court conclude d tha t a 
plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege only when he has 
" bas[ ed] his claim upon t he psychothe rapist's communications with 
him " or " 'selectively disclos[ ed] part of a privileged communication in 
"
191 o rder to gain an advantage in litigation.' 
Similarly, in In re Sims the Court of Appeals fo r the Second Circuit 
granted the plaintiffs request for a writ of mandamus after concluding 
that the trial court in that excessive fo rce case had abused its discre­
tion when it ordered the disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric 
records.192 The plaintiff had expressly and unambiguously withdrawn 
his claims fo r emotional distress damages , and the issue of the plain­
tiffs psychiatric history arose only in response to defense counsel's 
questions during the plaintiffs deposition.193 The appeals court found 
the reasoning in Koch to be persuasive and, in reversing t he district 
court's order, emphasized t he " transcendent importance of t he psy­
chotherapist-patient privilege."194 
188. Id. at 391. The panel also implicitly rejected the holding in a prior employment discrimi­
nation case, Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F . Supp. 2d 136, 138 (D.D.C. 2005) , which found a waiver 
based solely upon a claim that the plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress requiring treat­
ment with a psychotherapist. Koch, 489 F.3d at 387. The district court itself issued an opinion 
distinguishing Kalinoski and taking a fairly narrow approach a week after Koch was argued but 
before it was decided. Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at 
*4 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) . 
189. Koch, 489 F.3d at 390. 
190. Jd. 
191. Jd. (quoting S.E.C. v. Lavin , 111 F.3d 921, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ) (construing the marital 
privilege). By rejecting the defendant's arguments that the plaintiffs discovery responses trig­
gered a waiver of the privilege, the Koch court implicitly recognized that a response under the 
compulsion of the broad discovery rules does not satisfy the voluntariness requirement of a 
waiver. See also Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
that there was no waiver of patient-physician privilege by revealing communications in response 
to deposition questioning by opposing counsel) ; Kromenacker v. Blystone, 539 N.E.2d 675, 678 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) . 
192. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 141 (2d Cir . 2008). 
193. Jd. 
194. Jd. at 134. 
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2. 	 "Garden-Variety Emotional Distress" Versus Specific Psychiatric 
Injury 
Several courts have adopted the category of "garde n-variety emo­
tional distress " as a means to differentia te cases where there has not 
been an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.195 
This distinction was apparently first coined in a discovery ruling in 
Sabree v. United Brothers of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 
No. 33 , a pre-Jaffee race discrimination case.196 A magistrate judge 
initially de termined that the court should recognize a psychotherapist­
patient privilege.197 In concluding tha t there was no applicable "ex­
ception" to the psychotherapist-patient privilege present, she noted: 
"Sabree has not placed his mental condition at issue. Sabree makes a 
' garden-va riety' claim of emotional distress , not a claim of psychic in­
jury or psychiatric disorder resulting from the alleged discrimina­
tion."198 The courts that have employed this distinction will decline to 
order disclosure of psychotherapy records if a plaintiff asserts a claim 
for e motional distress without alleging a specific diagnosable mental 
condition as a component of compensatory damages or without offer­
ing the testimony of an expert witness to prove emotional distress.199 
" Garden-variety emotional distress" is a legal term , not a psychiat­
ric term ,200 and it is not a particularly useful construct.2°1 One com­
mentator refers to it as a " vegeta rian metaphor" used to distinguish 
" meatier" claims of emotional distress.202 A few courts have at­
195. See Gott, supra note 10, at 97- 100; Mara Kent & Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights 
Claimants: Should They Be Required to Give Up Their Physician-Patient Privilege When Alleg
ing Garden-Variety Emotional Distress? , 77 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 479, 480 (2000). 
196. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426 
(D. Mass. 1989). One commentator has referred to the decision as "landmark.» Sherry L. Rus­
chioni, Confidentiality ofMental Health Records in Federal Courts: The Path Blazed by Sabree v. 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local No. 33, 38 NEw ENG. L. REv. 
923, 924 (2004). 
197. Sabree, 126 F.R.D. at 426. The magistrate judge appears to have reached this conclusion 
in part due to the sensitive nature and marginal relevance to the proceedings of the plaintiffs 
psychotherapy records, which she had reviewed in camera. !d. 
198. !d. 
199. See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534, at 
*5 (E. D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (referring to those courts employing the garden-variety distinction 
as taking the "middle approach"); EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224-25 (N.D. Cal. 
2006); Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
200. Saul Rosenberg & Mark Levy, Unwarranted Restrictions on the Independent Examination 
of Emotional Damages, DEF. CoMMENT, Spring 2004, at 11- 12 (critiquing development of the 
term "garden-variety» in the context of compeUed mental examinations as a "scientifically 
meaningless concept"). 
201. See RANDOM Ho USE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 2006), which 
defines garden-variety as "common, usual, or ordinary; unexceptional." 
202. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n .94.2. 
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tempted to define "garden-variety" emotional distress, while others 
simply employ the term to describe a plaintiff's claims.203 Many 
courts employing such terminology place great weight on the presence 
of a psychiatric diagnosis.204 But a diagnosis reveals little in terms of 
the severity of emotional damages. While a plaintiff may indicate in 
response to discovery queries that she has been diagnosed with a par­
ticular mental disorder, it does not necessarily follow that she will of­
fer evidence of such diagnosis to support her claim for damages.205 
Further, it is highly unusual for an individual receiving psychother­
apy of some kind to not be diagnosed with a condition found in the 
American Psychia tric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders.206 Insurance companies and publicly funded 
health care programs invariably require a clinical diagnosis in order to 
approve coverage for psychothe rapy,2°7 and there are several diagno­
ses appropria te for temporary or mild conditions.208 Accordingly, a 
plaintiff's diagnosis with a mental disorder is not a sound basis for 
203 . See, e.g., Santos v. Boeing Co., No . 02-C-9310, 2003 WL 23162439, at *2 (N.D.lll. Oct. 21, 
2003) (denying defendant's motion to compel discovery of plaintiff's mental health records). 
204. See, e.g. , Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 557 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (col­
lecting cases). 
205. If she does offer the diagnosis as evidence, most courts would likely require her to do so 
through expert medical testimony, in which case there might be a waiver as a result of offering 
such evidence. See, e.g., 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 551 (1996) . The practice guide explains: 
While a nonexpert or lay witness may not give expert testimony as to his physical con­
dition, he may state simple inferences drawn from his conscious subjective sensations 
concerning such condition .... According to some authority, a witness should be con­
fined to testimony or statements relating to the outward appearance of his injuries and 
to the symptoms experienced by him, such as pain, suffering, and the like, and should 
not be permitted to testify as to the nature of his injuries, the applicable medical termi­
nology, and the like, and the medical prognosis or treatment. According to some cases, 
a witness may not testify as to whether or not he had a particular disease or was treated 
for a particular disease. 
Id. 
206. AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL oF MENTAL DISOR­
DERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000) . 
207. See i.d. at 1 (noting that the United States Health Care Finance Administration mandates 
use of the DSM's codes " for purposes of reimbursement" and that many private insurers require 
use of the codes as well). While not every person receiving psychotherapy is covered by insur­
ance or a publicly funded program, it is likely to be a substantial percentage that, at one point or 
another in treatment, has some degree of coverage, thus triggering the diagnosis requirement. 
208. See, e.g. , i.d. at 683 ("Adjustment Disorders" are a group of conditions marked by "the 
development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable stressor(s) oc­
curring within three months of the onset of the stressor(s)"); id. at 604 ("Primary Insomnia" is a 
disorder primarily characterized by a "difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or nonrestorative 
sleep, for at least 1 month."). 
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de termining whether there is a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.209 
Similarly, some courts distinguish garde n-variety emotional distress 
from other emotional distress based upon whether the plaintiff has 
sought psychotherapy for the condition. As one magistrate judge ex­
plained with respect to his understanding of non-garden-variety emo­
tional distress, " Generally what we find in these cases is someone 
sought psychotherapy."210 Under this circular reasoning, a person 
who has psychotherapy records, and therefore something to protect 
with the psychotherapist-patient privilege, does not by definition have 
garden-va riety emotional distress. Of course, there are several rea­
sons why one does or does not seek therapy, which may have little to 
do with the severity of the e motional distress.211 Indeed, once litiga­
tion is inevitable, a plaintiff may decide to discontinue psychotherapy 
for the very reason that her records would be subject to discovery, 
only to find that the defendant can successfully argue tha t the alleged 
emotional distress was minimal as demonstrated by the plaintiffs fail­
ure to seek treatmentztz 
3. 	 Applying Privacy, Fairness, and Relevance Rationales to Waiver 
Questions 
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court took to task the balancing approach 
followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had established 
only a conditional privilege, meaning that the application of the privi­
lege would consider the defendant's need for the evidence.213 This 
conceptualization is similar to that seen in the Connecticut statute 
which requires courts to weigh the " interests of justice" implicated by 
disclosure of privileged communications.214 Instead, the Supreme 
Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege as an "abso­
lute" privilege, which means that the opposing pa rty's need for the 
evide nce would not bea r on whether a court would enforce the privi­
lege. The absolute approach is not as inflexible as the name would 
209. Edward l mwinkelried proposed a waiver distinction based upon whether the plaintiff is 
merely asserting " transitory feelings . . . or sensations,» rather than a true "condition." IM. 
WINKELRIED, SUpra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 882-83. 
210. Orenstein, supra note 17, at 699. Magistrate Judge Orenstein went on to say that he 
thought that the garden-variety distinction in mental health cases, as opposed to general medical 
cases, was created to provide an additional layer of privacy for plaintiffs. Jd. at 702. 
211. One study by the American Psychiatric Association suggested that the overwhelming 
majority of individuals who experience anxiety and depression never seek treatment. Robinson, 
supra note 37, at 70. 
212. Jd. at 68. 
213. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996). 
214. See supra notes 8~9 and accompanying text. 
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imply; t he Supreme Court expressly acknowledged t he possibility of 
waiver and exceptions. Nonetheless , t he stated effect of creating an 
absolute privilege is to wholly eliminate from t he analysis any consid­
eratio n of competing interests of fairness, relevance, and t rut h-seek­
ing. H owever, while no trial o r appeals court of course admits to a 
rejection of the absolute approach set fo rth in Jaffee, such balancing in 
fact pervades the pos t-Jaffee case law in the context of the question of 
waiver. 
The tension between absolute and conditional privileges stems in 
large part from the broad scope of discovery unde r the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and fede ral courts ' general re luctance to limit the 
disclosure of any potentially releva nt information. As one fe de ral 
magistrate judge noted recently, " Contrary to t he common law 's ap­
proach , contempo rary thought has concluded that secrecy is not con­
genial to truth-seeking, and that trial by ambush is incompatible with 
t he just determination of cases o n their merits. "215 Thus, t he magis­
t rate judge continued, " As expansive as is t he definition of releva ncy 
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, t he [relevancy] sta n­
dard u nder Rule 26 [of t he Federal R ules of Civil Procedure] is even 
broade r."216 The burden of challe nging the scope of a discovery rule 
falls entirely upon the party seeking to limit disclosure , and it is gener­
ally a difficult burden to meet.217 
Federal courts invoking notions of fairness and truth-seeking when 
considering questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege employ analyses based upo n the scope of discovery permitted 
under Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 26, an approach that is sepa­
rate from, and independent of, privilege considera tions. The often­
cited ruling in Sarko v. Penn -Del Directory Co. , an A DA case consid­
ered soon aft er Jaffee , may have perpetuated the trend of weighing the 
t ruth-seeking fu nctions of broad discovery in the face of the newly 
established privilege.218 In fi nding a waiver by the plaintiff, the dis­
t rict court judge noted, relying on pre-Jaffee case law, t hat federal and 
state courts had long recognized waiver t hrough raising the issue of 
o ne' s psychological state.219 The judge concluded that it would be 
215. Hodgdon v. Nw. Univ., 245 F .R.D. 337, 341 (N.D. IU. 2007) . 
216. Jd. (internal cit ations omitted). Rule 26 provides, in pertinent part: " Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any 
party . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." F ED. R. CJv. P. 26(b)(1) . 
217. H odgdon, 245 F.R. D. at 341. 
218. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R. D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997) . 
219. Jd. at 130. 
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" contrary to t he most basic sense of fairness and justice " to permit the 
plaintiff to "hide [ ] behind a claim of privilege."22o 
Several other courts adopted and expanded this approach. A Te n­
nessee federal court, applying Tennessee law but relying upon fe de ral 
law precede nt, including Sarka, found a waiver of the psychotherapist­
pa tient privilege in a sexual harassment case because the plaintiff 
sought emotional distress damages and therefore, " application of the 
privilege would have denied t he opposing party access to information 
vital to his defense. "221 A judge in the Northern District of Illinois 
found a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and noted that 
the plaintiffs psychotherapist's trea tment notes were "extremely pro­
ba tive and ma terial to [the defendant's] defense."222 Another court 
ta king the broad view of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege noted in its decision: " It is a well-established rule of law that dis­
covery in discrimina tion cases should not be na rrowly circumscribed. 
The scope of discovery is particula rly broad in discrimination 
cases."223 Notably, however, all of the cases that the court cited for 
support were cases permitting broad discovery of defendants' employ­
ment practices and none involved claims of the psychotherapist-pa­
tie nt privilege.224 
By basing decisions rega rding whether or not there has been a 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the importance of 
the t ruth-seeking purposes of discovery and trial, these courts make 
two critical e rrors. First, as noted above, a waiver is most properly 
construed as an affirmative act of an individual through which known 
rights are not asserted. The benefit flowing to another party from 
such waiver of rights, or the corresponding burden imposed by the 
assertion of the rights, has no place in the analysis. Although the con­
cept of waiver requires courts to focus on a plaintiff's intentional ac­
tions, courts often give weight to how such evidence would play into 
and support defendants' theories to avoid liability or to lessen a dam­
age award. Once courts employ this le ns to determine whether to find 
a waiver, defendants almost invariably prevail.225 It is a rare case in 
220. Jd. 
221. Kirchner v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 129 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) . 
222. Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi ., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 
1999). 
223. Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *1 (D . Kan. Jan. 31, 2002) 
(citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F .2d 333, 34~ (10th Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
224. Jd. 
225. One notable exception is Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. IU. 1999), dis­
cussed infra at notes 337- 343 and accompanying text and note 373. 
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which the evidence would be both relevant and not subject to waiver, 
especially given the countless ways that a defendant could use such 
evide nce at trial.226 
The second flaw in these courts' reasoning is that it overlooks the 
fact that privileges necessa rily run counter to truth-seeking functions. 
Privileges exist where courts or legislatures have determined, for pol­
icy reasons , that such evide nce should be protected from disclosure, 
notwithstanding its relevance.227 As Dr. Slawson observed in his 1969 
criticism of the patient-litigant exception: "Truth like all other good 
things may be loved unwisely- maybe pursued too keenly-may cost 
too much."228 Thus, balancing privacy, facilitation of communications, 
or other values associated with privileges against truth-seeking, fair­
ness , and other aims of discovery occurs in the initial determination of 
whether to recognize a privilege in the first place, not whether to infer 
that a particular plaintiff has waived such privilege. With respect to 
the psychothe rapist-patient privilege specifically, Jaffee answered the 
balancing question by concluding, as a general matter, that "communi­
cations between a psychothe rapist and her patient ' promote[ ] suffi­
ciently important inte rests to outweigh the need for probative 
evide nce. ' "229 
The Supre me Court of Colorado in Johnson v. Trujillo acknowl­
edged the fundamental nature of a privilege when addressing the issue 
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.230 The court noted 
that the defendant's " most compelling argument" for why he needed 
access to a personal-injury-claim plaintiff's psychiatric records was 
that " the information sought may be relevant to a de termination of 
the extent to which Johnson's mental suffering is properly attributable 
to the accident as opposed to some othe r cause."231 H owever, the 
court noted, " it is the very nature of evidentiary witness privileges to 
' sacrifice some availability of evidence relevant to an administration 
of justice.' "232 Accordingly, "'relevance alone cannot be the test 
226. See supra notes 33- 37 and accompanying text. 
227. KunstJer v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
29, 2006) (" [R)elevance alone cannot trigger a finding that a party has waived a privilege, and 
most certainly not an absolute privilege."). 
228. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352 (quoting Lord Justice Knight Bruce in JoHN FRELINGHUY­
SEN HAGEMAN, PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATIONS AS A B RANCH OF LEGAL EvmENCE 10 (1889)). 
229. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9- 10 (1996) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) 
(quoting uammel v. United States, 445 U .S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
230. Johnson v. uujillo, 977 P .2d 152 (Colo. 1999). 
231. Jd. at 157. 
232. Jd. (emphasis added) (quoting CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK oN EvroENCE 
§ 72, at 101 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)). 
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'"233 The rationale for court-implied waivers of the privilege 
arose, not out of a concern for the unfairness of excluding potentially 
relevant evide nce, but rather the unfairness tha t may accompany a 
plaintiff's use of the privilege as a "sword instead of a shield," by " pa­
rading" a mental or physical condition while asserting the privilege at 
the same time.234 
As noted above, the nature of psychological harm and the broad 
scope of discovery generally enable defenda nts seeking such records 
to easily articulate the potential releva nce of a wide range of mental 
health records. Relevance, like necessity, is an appropriate consider­
ation unde r R ule 26, but it is not applicable to the question of 
waiver.235 A magistra te judge fo r the District of Maine accura tely and 
succinctly noted this important distinction: " [P]rivileges operate not­
withsta nding relevancy and ... the proper subject for the waiver anal­
ysis is whether the substance of a particular communication has been 
placed in issue , not whether the topic of communica tion is releva nt to 
the factual issues of the case."236 
Nonetheless, many courts weigh the potential relevance of the psy­
chotherapy discovery sought when determining whether to find 
waiver of t he psychotherapist-patie nt privilege. The District Court's 
rationale in Doe v. City of Chula Vista is typical: 
[T]o insure a fair trial, pa rticula rly on the element of causation [of 
emotional distress], ... defe ndants should have access to evidence 
t hat Doe's emotional state was caused by something else. D efend­
ants must be free to test the truth of Doe 's co ntention that she is 
emotionally upset because of the defe ndants' conduct.237 
In Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc. , a court similarly confused absolute 
and conditional privileges.238 In t hat case, the plaintiffs alleged dis­
crimination on the basis of race and national origin, and the defendant 
sought the comple te file of the plaintiffs' psychotherapist. The court 
recognized tha t the records may be subject to a psychotherapist-pa­
tie nt privilege but, after briefly citing the conflicting case law regard­
ing waiver, the court concluded: " It is clear t hat a balancing of the 
interests must be done, the Defendant's interest in obtaining informa­
233. Jd. (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994)). 
234. Jd. (citing McCoRMICK, supra note 232, § 103, at 146). 
235. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[S]tanding alone, the relevance of the 
information [sought in discovery] is inadequate to support a finding of an iniplied waiver. "). 
236. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 
21, 2001); see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d . 117, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) ("'[P]arties .. . do not forfeit [a 
privilege] merely by taking a position that the evidence might contradict."' (quoting United 
States v. Salerno, 505 U .S. 317, 323 (1992) )). 
237. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D . 562, 569 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
238. Sanchez v. U .S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. Pa . 2001). 
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tion directly relevant to the claims being made by Plaintiffs, and the 
Plaintiffs' privacy interest in shielding personal and potentially irrele­
vant information. "239 The district court concluded that precluding dis­
closure of the records, " [t]hough convenie nt to Plaintiffs ... is 
unsatisfactory to our adversarial system of justice."240 Accordingly, it 
held, " [I]t is clear that Defendant's interest in defending Plaintiffs' 
claim must outweigh Plaintiffs' privacy interest in these records."241 
While notions of fairness to the parties and the importance of provid­
ing fact finders competing evidence are central, important aims in our 
system of adversary litigation, their consideration has no place in an 
analysis of whether a plaintiff has waived a privilege if that privilege is 
to be given any force.242 
Sanchez is among those federal court decisions that not only incor­
rectly weigh the relevance of the information sought to be discovered, 
but also improperly frame the question as that of the extent of a plain­
tiffs nebulous " privacy" interest, rather than a legally defined privi­
lege.243 Setting up a comparison of " privacy" to the broad right to 
discovery, these courts fail to acknowledge the critical distinction be­
tween privacy, as that concept is generally applied in Rule 26,244 and 
239. Id. at 135- 36. 
240. Id. at 136. 
241. Id. 
242. Remarkably, several federal courts that seemingly employ a Rule 26 approach fail to 
even consider the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See, e.g. , Moore v. Chertoff, 
No. 00-953, 2006 WL 1442447, at *2-3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2006) (granting motion to compel dis­
covery of plaintiffs' mental health records on basis of plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress, 
without mention of psychotherapist-patient privilege); Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, 
Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL 1071736, at *18-19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004); Owens v. Sprint/ 
United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 659-60 (D . Kan. 2004); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A. 
99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at *3 (D . Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Cleveland v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 
%-CV-1068, 1997 WL 309408, at *2 (N.D.N .Y. June 5, 1997) (holding, without reference to the 
privilege, that a defendant is entitled to discovery of medical and psychological records where a 
sexual harassment plaintiff asserts a claim for even "ordinary" emotional distress). 
243. Sanchez , 202 F.R.D. at 135- 36. Federal courts have not generally recognized a constitu­
tionally-based right to privacy extending to communications in psychotherapy, although some 
state courts have ruled that a limited constitutional right is implicated in such communications. 
See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970); In re B, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa . 1978); see also 
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976) (following the reasoning of Lif­
schutz and finding any constitutional right to be only conditional, not absolute). See generally 
Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Ralionales for the Confidentiality ofPsychotherapist-Patient 
Communications: Testimonial Privilege and the Constitution, 35 Hous. L. REv. 187, 210-14 
(1998); Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 
(1980). 
244. See Seattle Tunes Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (noting that, although 
Rule 26 "contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be 
implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule. "). For 
example, under Rule 26(c)(1) regarding protective orders: " (T]he court .. . may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
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the less flexible concept of privilege. For example, the U .S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that, by seeking a 
claim for emotional distress in association with his A DA claim, a 
plaintiff "may not maintain a claim of privacy in any me ntal he alth 
records."245 The U.S. District Court fo r the District of Minnesota, in a 
decision granting a defendant's motion to compel production of 
me ntal he alth records, reasoned that, " [W]hile t he Court is mindful of 
the privacy issues involved in the discovery of medical records, the 
Court also favors the broad contours of discovery. "246 Thus, "where 
[the] plaintiff put his e motional condition into issue ... he effectively 
waives his right to privacy in any releva nt and unprivileged medical 
records."247 Notions of privacy, like those of releva nce and fairness, 
while laudable, simply have no place in determining whether a plain­
tiff has taken affirmative steps tha t a court should regard as a knowing 
and de liberate waiver of a legally held right. 
Notably, the Supreme Court's rationale for the psychotherapist-pa­
tie nt privilege was not one of privacy, but of the broade r societal in­
terest in e ncouraging psychotherapy and, presumably, ca ndor during 
treatment. U nder this ra tionale, when the privilege is given limited 
effect, the adverse impact is on society, not the individual 's privacy 
interests. For this reason, Jaffee held tha t a balancing inquiry would 
" eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. "248 In other words, be­
cause a broader concern fo r social welfa re is implicated through rec­
ognition of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, considera tion of 
fairness to individual litigants is beyond the authority of the courts. 
Ironically, the instrumental rationale's role as an underpinning of 
the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege may contribute to courts ' mis­
placed application of the concept of waiver.249 Individual judges may 
share t he skepticism towards the ra tionale expressed in Justice Scalia's 
dissent, in which the Justice quipped: "[H]ow come psychotherapy 
or undue burden or expense . ..." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c) . This can include unnecessary invasions 
of a litigant's privacy. See a/so 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL , FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND 
PRoCEDURE§ 2036, at 487 (2d. ed. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York has noted that " balanc[ing] [a plaintiffs] right to privacy with [a] defendant['s] ... 
need for the information . .. invokes the principles of Federal Rule 26(c)(4)." Duck v. Port 
Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008). 
245. Manessis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Tr ansp., No. 02 CIV. 359SADF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 
(S.D.N. Y. Sept. 24, 2002). 
246. Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ. 00-2604, 2002 WL 3253%35, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 
28, 2002). 
247. Jd. 
248. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). 
249. See IMWJNKELRJED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 842 ("Waivability flows from the instru­
mental rationale. "). 
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got to be a thriving practice before the ' psychotherapis t privilege' was 
invented ?"250 In the absence of recognition of rationales such as pro­
tecting p rivacy and autonomy and e ncouraging individuals to enforce 
t heir federally protected rights, courts fail to appreciate how they u n­
dermine t he privilege by summarily finding waivers.z5t 
Cases such as Doe v. City of Chula Vista252 that emphasize the im­
portance of " test(ing] the t ru th" of emotional distress claims suggest 
another possible explanation for courts' extreme reluctance to shield 
mental health records from discovery: the essentially unqu antifiable 
extent of emotional distress and the imprecise nature of e motions and 
mental fu nctioning and their causes.253 The current civil justice sys­
tem gra nts wide latitude to fact finde rs to p lace moneta ry value on 
nonpecuniary damages, which can sometimes resu lt in seemingly la rge 
verdicts. Public perception and political arguments that t here are too 
few outer limits to t he values t hat jurors can assign to such damages 
have lead to tort reform legislation,Z54 as well as damages caps unde r 
t he Civil Rights Act of 1991.255 Under t his view, limiting defendants ' 
access to potentially relevant discovery on this form of d amages may 
appear to simply provide yet another advantage to plaintiffs seeking 
oversized verdicts. 
4. 	 Scope of the Waiver and Alternative Sources of Emotional 
Distress 
D e termining whether a part y has waived t he psychotherapist-pa­
tie nt privilege d oes not necessarily resolve p recisely what the party 
has waived. Thus , judges often grapple with an additional layer of 
controversy regarding which records fall within t he scope of the 
waiver. One significa nt area of discovery sparring is whether a plain­
tiff who is fou nd to have waived the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege 
250. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 24 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
251. See SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 136-37 (arguing that basing the psychothera­
pist-patient privilege on a deontological, rather than instrumental, rationale enables courts to 
take a " different [and superior) approach to the structure of the privilege and its exceptions») . 
252. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal 1999). 
253. See ABELE, supra note 40, at 8 (suggesting that there is a long-standing judicial suspicion 
of emotional distress claims). 
254. WrLLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL Mc CANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: PoLITICS, MEDIA, AND 
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 96 (2004) (noting that awards for nonpecuniary damages are a particular 
target of tort reform advocates because such awards are regarded by many as " arbitrary"); Steve 
Lohr, Bush's Next Target: Malpractice Lawyers, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 3, at 1 (noting that 
one feature of " tort reform " proposals is caps on "non-economic damages," including those for 
emotional distress). 
255. Steven A. Holmes, Costs, Not Quotas, Worry Some Foes of Rights Bill, N.Y. T IMES, May 
27, 1990, § 4, at 4 (discussing the drive to impose damage caps in Civil Rights Act of 1991) . 
122 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79 
must disclose mental health treatme nt received prior to the incident at 
issue in the litiga tion. Generally, once a court concludes that the re 
has been an implied waiver of the psychothera pist-patie nt privilege, it 
grants defendants broad access , not only to records of trea tment for 
the emotional distress for which recovery is sought, but also to any 
and all mental health records including those from yea rs prior to the 
incident at issue in the litiga tion. In so doing, it skips two critical steps 
in a proper analysis: it fails to consider whether such discovery falls 
within the Rule 26 concept of relevance, and it fails to link the scope 
of the waiver to the purported affirmative conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff giving rise to the waiver. 
While the relevance of records sought in discovery is not a proper 
consideration for determining whether there has been a waiver of any 
privilege with respect to such records, a court may always limit discov­
ery of information tha t is not " reasonably calcula ted to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence."256 Because recovery of damages in 
civil rights claims , including those brought pursuant to § 1983 or any 
of the federal nondiscrimination statutes, is a remedy that essentially 
sounds in tort,257 parties and judges look to tort law principles to de­
termine the relevance of evidence in support of or limiting damages 
claims. A plaintiff is entitled to full compensa tion fo r all injuries prox­
imately caused by the defendant's acts even if the injuries were "ag­
gravated by reason of a preexisting physical or mental condition."258 
Accordingly, a defendant may not use a plaintiff's preexisting condi­
tion , such as a particular emotional vulnerability, as a vehicle to es­
cape liability fo r emotional distress damages. This is reflected by the 
" eggshell skull" rule tha t a " defenda nt takes the plaintiff as it finds 
him or her."259 The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on compensatory 
256. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
257. See GEORGE R uTHERGLEN, MAJoR IssuES IN THE FEDERAL LAw oF EMPLOYMENT D1s. 
CRIMINATION 1 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that employment discrimination case law has " relied in­
creasingly on damages as a remedy for employment discrimination and therefore on tort 
principles to determine liability"). See also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U .S. 299, 
305 (1986) (" We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates 'a species of tort liability' 
... ."); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U .S. 189, 195 (1974) (noting that a damages claim brought pursu­
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "sounds basically in tort- the statute merely defines a new legal duty, 
and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's 
wrongful breach") . The same analysis applies to damages claims sought under other civil rights 
statutes. See DoBBS, supra note 24, at 81-82 (" Civil rights violations are torts. They have gener­
ated an important specialty, in which the courts look to common law tort rules as models without 
necessarily accepting their limitations. "). 
258. 22 AM. J u R. 2d Damages § 239 (2003). 
259. Id. See also Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that, under Texas 
law: " [T]ortfeasors take their victims as they find them, even when the claimed harm is mental 
anguish or emotional distress. A victim 's particular susceptibility wiU not reduce the damages 
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damages also indicates that a defendant will be liable for e motional 
distress damages of a plaintiff who was previously " emotionally sensi­
tive."260 This rule suggests that a defendant may not offer evide nce of 
a plaintiffs preexisting mental condition as a means to avoid liability 
for emotional distress that results from the defendant's actions. 
What is less clear, however, is whether a defendant may assert that 
it should not be held liable fo r the full amount of the plaintiff's emo­
tional distress damages, due to an underlying mental disorder or alter­
native sources of emotional distress. A defendant is liable for any 
harm, including emotional distress, so long as her " conduct is a sub­
stantial factor in bringing about the harm. "261 As a general principle, 
a defendant may seek apportionment of damages among other causes, 
but only where it makes a showing that "there is a reasonable basis fo r 
de termining the contribution of each cause to a single harm."262 Oth­
erwise, the harm is deemed to be "indivisible " and not subject to 
apportionmenf.263 
available."); Miley v. Landry, 582 So. 2d 833, 837 (La. 1991) ("When a defendant's negligent 
conduct aggravates a pre-existing condition, the victim must be compensated for the full extent 
of the aggravation. " (internal citations omitted)); DoBBS, supra note 24, at 851-52 (explaining 
that thin skull rules apply to claims for emotional harm, except in cases where a person would 
not be expected to suffer any emotional harm at all and hence the plaintiff's reaction to the 
event was wholly unforeseeable). 
260. Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available under § 102 of 
the Civil Rights A ct of 1991 , 2 EMPL . PRAC. GumE (CCH) 'II 5360, July 14, 1992, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html (hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] ("The fact 
that the complaining party may be unusually emotionally sensitive and incur great emotional 
harm from discriminatory conduct will not absolve the respondent from responsibility for the 
greater emotional harm."). 
261. RESTATEMEI'rr (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 431 cmt. a (1965) ("The word 'substantial' is used 
to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to 
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause . .. . ").The same analysis applies to the torts of 
negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which are sometimes included in com­
plaints alleging discrimination or violation of civil rights. The defendant's wrongful actions need 
not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress, but must be a "substantial cause. " See 
Ferguson v. United States Army, 938 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 260. 
262. RESTATEMEI'rr (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 433A (1965). The rules set forth in section 433A 
apply not only to instances where there may be more than one tortfeasor, but also 
where one or more of the contributing causes is an innocent one, as where the negli­
gence of a defendant combines with the innocent conduct of another person, or with 
the operation of a force of nature, or with a pre-existing condition which the defendant 
has not caused, to bring about the harm to the plaintiff. 
ld. cmt. a. 
263. ld. cmt. i ("Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any 
logical, reasonable, or practical division. "). See also Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 
1093 (Me. 1995) ("The single injury rule places any hardship resulting from the difficulty of 
apportionment on the proven wrongdoer and not on the innocent plaintiff."); DoBBS, supra note 
24, at 425. 
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The Court of Appeals for the E ighth Circuit applied these princi­
ples to questions of discovery and burden shifting in a sexual harass­
ment class action case where the defenda nts had adva nced an 
alterna tive source of e motional distress damages argument. In Jenson 
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., female e mployees of a large mining company 
brought a class action lawsuit under Title VII seeking remedies for 
widespread and systematic sexual harassment.264 The Special Master 
appointed by the district court permitted broad discovery of the plain­
tiffs ' personal backgrounds including "detailed medical histories, 
childhood experiences, domestic abuse, abortions, and sexual relation­
ships."265 Although the Special Master initially reasoned that such 
discovery was proper because it was the defenda nts' burden to show 
that events other than the alleged harassment proximately caused the 
plaintiffs' emotional distress, at the time of trial he re-assigned plain­
tiffs the burden of disproving alterna tive causes of their distress.266 
Reversing on appeal, the Eighth Circuit criticized both the denial of 
the plaintiffs' requests for protective orders against such invasive dis­
covery267 and the reassignment of the burde n of proof on causation.268 
Citing a string of cases from other courts and legal contexts, the panel 
noted that a "tortfeasor is liable for all of [the] natural and proximate 
consequences" of its actions,269 which " include[ d] damages assessed 
. . . for harm caused to a plaintiff who happens to have a fragile 
psyche."270 Because the Special Master in Jenson had concluded that 
the plaintiffs' emotional harm was indivisible, the defendants were 
foreclosed from seeking apportionment, rendering the plaintiffs' prior 
psychological and medical histories irrelevant.271 
264. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). The claims were filed prior 
to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but the plaintiffs were able to seek emo­
tional distress damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Jd. at 1290. 
265. Jd. at 1292. 
266. Jd. at 1293. 
267. Jd. at 1292-93. 
268. Jd. at 1294. 
269. Jd. 
270. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1295. The plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden largely because 
the Special Master also precluded them from offering any expert testimony in support of their 
emotional distress claims on the basis that none of the proffered experts had "advanced a vali­
dated theory" for allocating "causal effect of multiple psychological stresses or trauma." /d. at 
1297. This ruling was also reversed on appeal. /d. at 1298. 
271. Jd. at 1294. However, a comment to section 433 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
ToRTS, titled Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is Substantial 
Factor in Producing Harm, suggests that a fact finder may consider whether "[s]ome other event 
which is a contributing factor in producing the harm may have such a predominant effect in 
bringing it about as to make the effect of the actor's negligence insignificant and, therefore, to 
prevent it from being a substantial factor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T oRTS § 433 cmt. d 
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Following Jenson, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri in R obinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc. precluded de­
fendants from seeking discovery regarding whether the plaintiff in the 
sexual harassment claim had any extramarital affairs at the time of the 
alleged harassment.272 While the case did not involve the discovery of 
me ntal health records, the analysis applies with equal force in cases in 
which a defendant bases a discovery request for such records on the 
rationale that it is exploring potential alternative causes of e motional 
distress. The judge in Robinson noted that the defendants there had 
suggested " no way in which they can satisfy their obligation to segre­
gate the ' harassment-induced stress ' from the 'extramarital affair-in­
duced stress ,'" and therefore would have no basis to make such 
argument to the jury at trial.273 The significance of the ruling was not 
lost on the judge, as she noted: "The Court concedes that it may be 
impossible for any defendant to satisfy this burden because psycholog­
ical conside rations are not subject to such nice categorizations; none­
theless, the rule is clearly established in Jenson."v4 Accordingly, 
" [d]efendants ca nnot simply present evidence of alleged stressors and 
leave it to the jury to determine whether, and to what extent, the emo­
tional damage attributable to Plaintiffs various stress factors is 
divisible. "275 
Indeed, it is fair to question whether e motional distress damages 
and other psychological injuries can ever meet the requirements for a 
" divisible" harm that could be subject to apportionment. Determin­
ing and quantifying causa tion of psychological distress is not an exer­
cise that contemporary psychotherapists generally undertake. The 
(1965). This would suggest that some alternative causes of harm, including emotional distress, 
may be the proper subject of trial evidence (and by extension discovery). 
272. Robinson v. Canon U .S.A., Inc., 82 FEP Cases 1129 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2000) . A sepa­
rate , additional basis of the court's ruling was Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which limits the 
admissibility of evidence of a civil plaintiffs sexual history. Jd. 
273. Jd. at 1130. 
274. Jd. 
275. Jd. Further, there are indications that evidence of prior mental health treatment can be 
effective in lowering defendants' exposure. Courts, and presumably juries, have decreased dam­
age awards in civil rights cases based upon evidence of alternative and preexisting causes of 
emotional distress. For example, in a sexual harassment case, Hurley v. Atlantic City Police De­
partment, 933 F. Supp. 396 (D .N.J. 1996), the court granted the defendant's motion for remitti­
tur, reducing the jury's award of $575,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress to 
$175,000. The court based its decision in part upon the opinion of the defendant's expert psychi­
atric witness that " the difficulties plaintiff has faced and continues to face are rooted in sources 
other than workplace harassment, such as a troubled childhood marked by sexual molestation, 
abandonment, and foster homes; physical abuse by both of her husbands; and other severe per­
sonal, marital and family problems unrelated to her work environment. " Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 
424. 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has little to say 
about the causes of such disorde rs.276 As o ne pair of defense-oriented 
forensic examiners asserted: 
[I]n the contemporary biopsychosocial medical model of diagnosis, 
t he " causation" of mental events is explained from the perspective 
of multiple interactions between biology , psychology and t he social 
milieu. From the biopsychosocial perspective , all of the poten tially 
interacting causes (preexisting, concurren t, and subsequen t) t hat 
may explain a particular mental injury must be investigated in order 
to arrive at a comprehensive and valid understanding of the alleged 
mental damages.277 
The authors argue tha t this comprehensive approach to causation jus­
tifies " a thorough and careful investiga tion of a plaintiff's life course 
and developmental history prior to, during, and after the allegedly in­
jurious event."278 But the complexity of determining causation cannot 
alone provide the ra tionale for compelling discovery of a plaintiff's 
lifetime of mental health records absent a clea r legal vehicle to ad­
vance such argume nts. 
Nonetheless, courts generally permit defenda nts to discover histori­
cal mental health records upon a finding of waiver, and they offer lit­
tle scrutiny of the releva nce of such records. Apparently, no court 
considering the issue of waiver of the psychotherapis t-pa tient privi­
lege has followed the reasoning of Jenson or Robinson or broader tort 
principles of apportionment of harm. In Rose v. Vermont Mutual In­
surance Co. , the court permitted extensive discovery of a plaintiff's 
mental health history as a result of her claim fo r emotional distress 
da mages , which is typical of courts' bare mention of the scope of dis­
covery in cases where a defendant seeks a plaintiff's mental health 
records.279 Once the plaintiff was found to have waived t he psycho­
therapist-patie nt privilege, the court concluded that such waiver "'ap­
276. Druk:teinis, supra note 19 (" In general, DSM-JV-TR does not focus on the etiology of 
psychiatric diagnosis and, by extension, causation."). The notable exception is the diagnostic 
criteria for Post-Tr aumatic Stress Disorder, which includes: "[Ilhe person experienced, wit­
nessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or 
serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others." AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N, 
supra note 206, at 4{,7. 
277. Mark I. Levy & Saul E. Rosenberg, The " Eggshell Plaintif ' Revisited: Causation of 
Mental Damages in Ci vil Litigat ion, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 205 
(2003). 
278. Jd. 
279. Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL 3333394 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (d.i­
versity case in which the court purported to follow Vermont law on the scope of the psychothera­
pist-patient privilege) . The court also concluded that the fact that the plaintiffs depression had 
an onset prior to the accident took it out of the possible " garden-variety" protection afforded to 
some emotional d.istress claims. Jd. at *2. 
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plie(d] to the discovery of matters causally or historically related to 
the patient-plaintiff's health put in issue by the injuries and damages 
"280claimed in the action.' 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Soci­
ety , the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment and gender discrimina­
tion.281 The court denied the plaintiff's request to limit discovery of 
her mental health records to the health care providers she saw during 
or after her period of employment with the defendant and to further 
limit the information to that " associated with [the plaintiff's] employ­
me nt.''282 The trial court reasoned that "information in the records 
may shed light on other contributing causes of [the plaintiff's] claims 
of e motional distress.''283 
In addition to addressing these questions of relevance before a 
plaintiff's lifetime of mental health tre atment can be subject to discov­
ery, a court must also make a specific finding that the plaintiff waived 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to the communica­
tions with each treatment provider, a step notably absent from federal 
courts' analysis of waiver. Thus, merely sta ting a claim for e motional 
distress arising from an incidence of discrimination in 2005, for exa m­
ple, cannot serve as a basis for seeking psychotherapy records from 
the yea r 2001. Rather, a court must identify an affirmative act by the 
plaintiff consistent with a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege as to those communica tions from 2001 as well. In a case where 
the plaintiff releases the e arlier records to a current psychotherapist 
or a forensic examiner who will offer an expert opinion based in part 
upon such records , a court may properly find an express or implied 
waiver with respect to those records. In the absence of evide nce of an 
action by a plaintiff effectuating such a waiver, the records cannot be 
280. Jd. (quoting Mattison v. Poulen, 353 A.2d 327, 330 (Vt. 1976)). 
281. EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No. 8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *3 
(D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007). 
282. Jd. 
283. Jd. See also Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL 
1071736, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (permitting discovery of plaintiffs psychotherapy 
records for a period back to two years prior to the commencement of her employment with 
defendants); Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 
2002) (permitting discovery of plaintiff's psychotherapy records for a period back to three years 
prior to when the discriminatory conduct was alleged to have occurred); McKenna v. Cruz, No. 
98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (permitting discovery of plain­
tiffs psychotherapy records for the five-year period prior to the incident at issue in plaintiffs 
excessive force claim) . 
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subject to discovery, rega rdless of the defenda nt's theory of 
relevance. 284 
5. Compelled Psychological Exams Under Rule 35 
In several cases, a discovery request for the release of psychother­
apy records is paired with a dema nd for a psychological or psychiatric 
evaluation under R ule 35 of the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure.285 
Courts sometimes couple and often confuse t he analysis of waiver of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and Rule 35 psychological exa m­
ina tions.286 Such confusion is not entirely surprising. In the years 
before federal courts analyzed whether a plaintiff could be compelled 
to turn over records and other information regarding her mental 
health under a t heory of implied waiver, courts considered whether 
she could be compelled to submit to a psychological examination by 
placing her mental condition "in controversy. "287 While the two ques­
tions appea r similar, t he distinctions are critical to the proper applica­
tion of waiver of a privilege. 
Rule 35, in a somewhat different fo rm from its current language, 
was among the original civil procedure rules promulga ted by the 
U nited States Supreme Court in 1938.288 It was met with controversy 
because Rule 35 reversed, through court rule rather than statute, the 
well-settled rule in fede ral courts prohibiting compelled physical ex­
284. See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that, while the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege may limit a defendant's access to certain records, a defendant 
has other means, such as cross-examination, to challenge a plaintiffs emotional distress claims). 
285. Rule 35 provides, in pertinent part: "(T)he court in which the action is pending may 
order [a] party [whose mental or physical condition is in controversy) to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner." FED. R. C.v. P. 35(a) . See also 
Gaines-Hanna v. Farmington Pub. Sch., No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 WL 932074, at *10 (E .D. 
Mich. Apr. 7, 2006); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assoc., II, P.C., No. Civ. A. 03-2034, 
2004 WL 1813232, at *3 (E. D. Pa. July 21, 2004); Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 
551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at 
*4 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Colo. 1998). In Young, 
the court did not expressly find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but the court 
did grant the defendants' motion to compel production of documents and answers to interroga­
tories pertaining to the plaintiff's mental health history based, with no analysis, upon the same 
rationale ("plaintiff has placed her mental state at issue") applied to its decision to grant the 
defendant's motion to take a Rule 35 psychiatric examination of the plaintiff. Young, 2004 WL 
1813232, at *3-4. 
286. In Gaines-Hanna, the trial court applied the post-Jaffee case Jaw of implied waiver to 
determine whether the defendants were entitled to subject the plaintiff to a Rule 35 psychiatric 
examination, and based upon that analysis, further concluded that the defendants were entitled 
to receive records documenting the plaintiffs psychiatric treatment during the prior twelve 
years. Gaines-Hanna, 2006 WL 932074, at *8, 11- 12. 
287. FED. R. C1v. P. 35(a). 
288. SA WRIGHT ET A L , supra note 244, § 2231. 
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amination of litigants.289 One of the ea rliest challe nges came in Sib­
bach v. Wilson & Co. , in which the Supreme Court upheld the new 
rule as a valid exercise of the Court's power to promulgate procedural 
rules pursuant to the 1934 Rules Enabling Act.290 Joined by three 
Justices , Justice Frankfurter vigorously argued in dissent that the 
Court did not have the power to effect such a "drastic change in public 
policy," which affected the " inviolability of a person."291 
In 1964, a divided Supreme Court construed Rule 35 in Schlagen­
hauf v. Holder, a case that conside red the applicability of the rule to a 
compelled examination of a defendant.292 The Court specifically re­
jected the argument that Sibbach had been decided on the grounds 
that a plaintiff, by bringing an action for damages, had somehow 
waived his privacy interests.293 Indeed, Justice Goldberg, writing for 
the majority, seemed to reject a waiver rationale, noting that it would 
mean that " a plaintiff has waived a right by exercising his right of 
access to the federal courts," and that " [s]uch a result might create 
constitutional problems."294 Rather, the basis for compelling exami­
nations of either plaintiffs or defendants was nothing more than the 
plain language of Rule 35, which was within the Court's authority to 
promulgate.295 
Although the Court upheld Rule 35, it also provided guidelines to 
the lower courts regarding the application of the rule. It emphasized 
that the rule " requires discriminating application by the trial judge, 
who must decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the party 
requesting a mental or physical examination or examinations has ade­
quately demonstrated the existence of the Rule's requirements of ' in 
controversy' and 'good cause.' "296 As an example of a fairly straight­
forward determination of these issues, the Court noted: "A plaintiff 
in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury places that 
mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the de­
fendant with good cause for an examination to determine the exis­
289. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U .S. 1, 16-17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting) (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 
(1891)). 
290. Sibbach, 312 U .S. at 16 (majority opinion) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072, formerly § 723b). 
291. Jd. at 17- 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
292. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). 
293. Jd. at 113- 14. 
294. Jd. at 114. The comments on waiver were prompted by Justice Douglas's dissent, in 
which he argued that a defendant cannot be considered to have waived the "inviolability of the 
person" because he has been " dragged" to court. Jd. at 126 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). By con­
trast, a plaintiff may " choose between his privacy and his purse." Id. 
295. Jd. at 114 (majority opinion) . 
296. Jd. at 118-19. 
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tence and extent of such asserted injury."297 By contrast, the 
defendant in that case had not " affirmatively put into issue his own 
mental or physical condition" through any sort of claim or defense of 
his own.298 
In case law that parallels and sometimes intersects that regarding 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, many courts have held 
that Rule 35 psychiatric exa minations are not warranted solely on the 
basis of a claim for emotional distress damages,Z99 or with respect to 
liability in sexual harassment claims.300 G enerally, courts d o not orde r 
such examinations absent allegations of ongoing emotional distress.301 
For example, in Fox v. Gates Corp. , the court attempted to summarize 
the guidelines that had developed for determining when a court may 
order a Rule 35 mental health exa mination and concluded that there 
were five pertinent factors, one or more of which must be present: 
(1) plaintiff has asserted a specific cause of action for intentional or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) plaintiff has alleged a 
specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; (3) plai ntiff has 
claimed unusually severe emotional distress; (4) plaintiff has offered 
expert testimony in support of her claim for emotional distress dam­
ages; and (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental condition is "in con­
troversy" within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a).302 
R elying on case law involving waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, the court noted that claims for mere "garden-variety" emo­
tional distress were not sufficient to trigger the Rule 35 factors.303 
H owever, in the sa me opinion the court concluded that the plaintiff 
had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to dis­
2fJ7. Id. at 119 (internation citations omitted). 
298. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121. 
299. See Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Colo. 1998) ("A minority of courts have 
held that a plaintiff puts her mental condition 'in controversy' by simply making a claim for 
emotional distress damages as part of an employment discrimination claim.»); Jennifer Wriggins, 
Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 
77 B.U. L. REv. 1025, 1072 n.234 (19fJ7). 
300. See Margaret Bu11 Kovera & Stacie A. Cass, Compelled Mental Health Examinal ions, 
Liability Decisions, and Damage Awards in Sexual Harassment Cases: Issues for Jury Research, 8 
PsvcHoL. Pun. PoL'Y & L. 96, 98 (2002) . 
301. Id. ; see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (hold­
ing that, because the plaintiffs' claims were for " past, not present" emotional distress, there was 
no basis to order a Rule 35 psychological examination). 
302. Fox , 179 F.R.D. at 307. 
303. Jd. (citing Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 
F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989) ). 
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closure of her psychotherapy records as a result of her emotional dis­
tress damage claim.304 
As the majority noted in Schlagenhauf, Rule 35 provides fede ral 
courts the authority to de termine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to 
compel a litigant to submit to a particular form of pretrial discov­
ery.305 It does not provide authority to compel a waiver of a recog­
nized right. However, courts have ignored this important distinction 
and instead based their decisions on their own perception of the rela­
tive intrusiveness of a mental examination versus the compelled dis­
closure of mental health treatment records. Specifically, some courts 
erroneously conclude that a Rule 35 examination is necessarily more 
intrusive and, therefore, courts can be less circumspect about the re­
lease of psychothe rapy records.306 
Rule 35 examinations are unquestionably intrusive and can be quite 
distressing, particularly where an inordinate focus is given to abuse, 
trauma, and sexual and gynecological history in sexual harassme nt 
cases.307 However, such examinations do not implicate the psycho­
therapist-patie nt privilege unless disclosure of prior treatme nt records 
is included in the order compelling examination.308 While an exam­
ine r might request past psychotherapy records or ask the plaintiff 
some questions about past treatme nt, de tailed disclosure of prior psy­
chiatric treatment is not a necessar y component of the exam. Rather, 
the examination is a one-time evaluation during litigation in which no 
privileged communications ar e made. There is little risk that the Rule 
35 exam will result in the revelation of deep secrets and vulnerabili­
ties, such as might be revealed during a psychotherapy session outside 
of the context of litigation, because the plaintiff knows that the results 
of the exam and all statements made during the course of it will be 
revealed to the opposing party.309 Indeed, in Vasconcellos v. Cybex 
304. Jd. at 306. The court did impose some limitations on the time frame on records that 
would be subject to disclosure and, in deed, it was not clear from the ruling whether there were in 
fact any records that would be disclosed as a result. 
305. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U .S. 104 (1964). 
306. See, e.g. , Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 623 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The inva­
sion of privacy occasioned by allowing opposing counsel to obtain copies of a plaintiff's psycho­
logical records, where there is a claim of ordinary mental distress, is exceedingly less 
burdensome than a Rule 35(a) examination. "). 
307. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, A New Framework for Sexual Harassment Cases, T RIAL, Mar. 
2003, at 36, 38; Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272. 
308. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 99. 
309. See EE OC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (" [I]f anything, delving 
into a plaintiffs medical or psychological records is even more invasive than conducting a medi­
cal or psychological examination . . .."); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 632 (S.D . 
Cal. 1999) ("Many, if not most, people would undoubtedly prefer to submit to a mental examina­
tion, in which they have a d egree of control over what information is revealed, than to have the 
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International, Inc. , the plaintiff volunteered to unde rgo a psychia tric 
examination in support of her motion to quash defendant's subpoena 
of her treating psychotherapist' s records.310 
Thus, intrusiveness is not the proper lens through which the two 
discovery issues should be addressed; ra ther, courts should look to the 
na ture of the rights at stake. The Supreme Court has recognized the 
psychotherapist-patie nt privilege as a right held by all individuals, 
which must be respected and enforced in the absence of a finding of 
waiver. Accordingly, the analysis e mployed unde r a discovery rule 
has no application. 
6. The Special Problem of ADA Cases 
The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege in the 
context of ADA cases presents a special problem. Several courts have 
been quick to conclude that asserting a claim under the ADA effectu­
ates a waiver of t he psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, either because 
the plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages or simply because she 
alleges that she is disabled due to a psychiatric condition. Some courts 
have made remarkably broad proclamations of this conclusion while 
being particularly dismissive of plaintiffs' assertions of the psychother­
apist-patient privilege. 
One of the leading cases articulating the broad view of waiver, 
Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,311 is an ADA case decided the yea r 
after Jaffee. The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated from her 
employment after she disclosed to her e mployer that she required 
medica tion to treat depression and sought an accommodation.312 The 
court noted, based la rgely on Third Circuit and Pennsylva nia state 
court precede nt, that a party waives the psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege by " placing her mental condition at issue. "3 13 The court easily 
found that the plaintiff had placed her mental condition in issue and 
records of their past psychotherapy sessions disclosed to their adversaries in litigation.»). The 
Supreme Court of Colorado similarly noted: 
We can imagine many circumstances in which the compelled disclosure of sensitive and 
private medical and counseling records is as offensive or more offensive to a litigant's 
privacy, health, and dignity interests as a court-ordered mental examination would be. 
Moreover, unlike a court-ordered mental examination, court-ordered disclosure of con­
fidential records related to mental health treatment undercuts the additional, public 
interest furthered by the privileges of encouraging citizens to seek help for their emo­
tional problems. 
Johnson v. 11-ujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999). 
310. Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D. Md. 1997). 
311. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R. D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
312. Jd. at 129. 
313. Jd. at 130. 
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therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege by asserting 
that she was a qualified individual with a disability "by virtue of suf­
fering from clinical depression."314 Accordingly, the court ordered 
her to release " all records that contain[ed] confid ential communica­
tions with her psychiatrist that [were] relevant to her mental condition 
during the time she was in Defendant's employ."3t5 
One of the starkest statements of waiver in the ADA context was 
made by a judge in Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc.3 16 The court 
considered the issue of waiver in a case in which the plaintiff brought 
a claim under the ADA alleging that the defendant failed to reasona­
bly accommodate her Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and "severe de­
pression."317 The court ordered the plaintiff to comply with all 
outstanding requests for discovery-including those seeking her medi­
cal records-and to " make all of her experts available for deposi­
tion."318 The court reasoned: "In an action under the ADA, a 
plaintiff's medical history is relevant in its entirety."319 The court 
made no reference to the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privi­
lege or whether a finding of implied waiver was appropriate, and in­
stead expressed surprise that the plaintiff resisted releasing her 
records.320 Although the court acknowledged that " [e]lements of a 
claim under the ADA touch upon the most private and intimate de­
tails of a plaintiff's life," the court stated broadly: "ADA plaintiffs, 
like plaintiffs in an action for medical malpractice, waive all privileges 
and privacy inte rests related to their claim by virtue of filing the com­
plaint. "321 Several other cases have followed a simila r approach, hold­
ing that the assertion of an ADA claim is sufficient in itself to waive 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.322 
314. Jd. 
315. Jd. The court also ordered the plaintiff to submit to a mental examination pursuant to 
Rule 35. Jd. at 131. 
316. Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N .C. 1996) . 
317. Jd. at 91. 
318. Id. at 92. It is not clear from the decision whether any treating psychotherapists had been 
designated by the plaintiff as testifying experts. 
319. Jd. 
320. The court noted,"Although the action is based on the ADA, plaintiff has resisted disclos­
ing her medical records. " Jd. at 91. 
321. Jd. at 92. 
322. Calder v. T CI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D. 
Mo. July 21, 2001); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL 910443, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999); Patterson v. Chi. Ass'n for Retarded Children, No. 96 C 4713, 1997 WL 
323575, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997); lwanejko v. Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., No. 2:03CV1855, 2005 
WL 4043954, at *1 (W.O. Pa . Oct. 5, 1995). 
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These cases reveal misplaced assumptions about the relevancy and 
significa nce of such evidence. With respect to establishing disability­
as opposed to emotional distress damages- the court will not ask the 
jury to quantify precisely the extent of a plaintiffs mental condition, 
and questions of causation have no role whatsoever in an ADA analy­
sis.323 Rather, the definition of disability is a threshold inquiry regard­
ing the application of the statute. Similarly, analogies to medical 
malpractice cases, such as that found in the Butler case, are improper. 
In those cases, the medical care by the defendant is the central issue 
and filing such a claim is deemed to be a waiver of otherwise privi­
leged communications with the defendant. In an ADA case , the evi­
de nce and the fact finder should focus on whether there was unlawful 
discrimination based upon the plaintiffs disability. As commenta tors 
have observed, however, federal courts are too preoccupied with the 
definition of disability; therefore, it is not surprising tha t they would 
use the necessity of proof as a basis to find a broad waiver of the 
privilege.324 
v. BRINGING CERTAINTY TO THE QUESTION OF WAIVER 
Clearly, the current framing of the question of waiver of the psycho­
therapist-patient privilege is unworkable, as courts themselves note 
the sharp differences among their approaches.325 This uncertainty 
renders the privilege nearly illusory, and by so doing, undermines an 
alternative instrumental rationale for the existence of the privilege: 
the privilege e nables those who have sought mental health treatment 
to bring civil rights claims in federal court without concern that their 
treatment will necessarily become a central focus of discovery, and 
perhaps trial, over their objections. In order to serve this rationale, 
federal courts should approach questions of waiver of the psychother­
apist-patient privilege in a manner that is consistent with the general 
323. Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled? The Role ofMedical Evidence in the ADA 
Definition ofDisability, 82 T u L. L. REv. 1, 64, 69- 70 (2007) (contrasting jury assessments of tort 
damages and determinations of whether an ADA plaintiff meets the statute's definition of 
disability) . 
324. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
91, 92 (2000). One wonders whether courts would be so quick to conclude that there is a waiver 
of the clergy-believer privilege in every claim based upon religious discrimination. Indeed, I 
have not found a single case in which this issue was even raised. 
325. See, e.g. , Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008) ("The law on waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege is not set­
tled."); Samaan v. Sauer, No. Civ-S-07-0960, 2008 WL 214680, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2008) 
("Lower courts disagree on the test to determine whether the privilege is waived.") . 
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concepts of waiver in the law and that provides all litigants meaningful 
protection from unnecessary intrusion into their mental health history. 
A. An Alternative Instrumental Rationale 
Individuals who have sought mental health treatment hold an un­
certain privilege against disclosure of their psychotherapy records and 
therefore face a difficult dilemma when considering whether to pursue 
a civil claim in federal court. They must conside r whethe r they are 
willing to run the risk of opening the door to detailed information 
about their mental health treatment by alleging emotional injury re­
sulting from a deprivation of civil rights or other wrongdoing, or by 
alleging discrimination on the basis of mental illness. Undoubtedly, 
for some, the answer may simply be that the risk is too great. Thus, on 
the question of waiver , courts must shift their focus from an instru­
mental rationale based upon the questionable assumption tha t the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege e nsures that individuals seek psycho­
therapy in the first place, to a more realistic and pertinent instrumen­
tal rationale, namely, that of ensuring that those who have or had a 
mental illness and received treatment are not broadly discouraged 
from using the courts to remedy a deprivation of their rights.326 
Professor Anita Hill, whose mental health was the subject of scru­
tiny during the confirmation hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas,327 
spoke on this issue in 1993.328 She noted that only three percent of 
victims of sexual harassment pursue relief through litigation, and she 
attributes this to the financial and emotional burdens of pursuing such 
claims. She specifically argued that evidence rules that allow discov­
ery of a sexual harassment plaintiff's mental health history have a 
" chilling effect" on victims' decisions whethe r to pursue litigation.329 
326. Robinson, supra note 37, at 77 ("Millions of American workers are effectively thwarted 
from exercising their civil rights merely because they have undergone psychotherapy. "). 
327. PERLIN, supra note 42, at 22; see also JANE FLAX, T HE AMERICAN DREAM rN BLAcK & 
WHITE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS HEARINGS 65 (1998) ("Ostensibly searching for a motive, the 
senators speculated extensively about Anita Hill's psychology and relationships with men." ). 
328. Thaai Walker, Anita Hills Tells of Stress in Sex Harassment Cases , S.F . CHRON., Aug. 5, 
1993, at A7. 
329. 1d. See also Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that 
" (d]iscovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives . .. has the clear potential to discourage sexual 
harassment litigants from prosecuting lawsuits such as the instant one."); Beth S. Frank, Note, 
Protecting the Privacy ofSexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and 
Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
639, 663 (2001) ("Without the protection of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, individuals 
who seek therapy will be reluctant to bring suit or will not bring suit at all for legitimate claims of 
harassment out of fear that their mental health will be placed on trial."). 
136 DE PA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California , in an e arly decision ana­
lyzing the patient-litigant exce ption, conside red the risk that a broad 
reading of the exce ption " might effectively deter many psychothera­
peutic patients fr om instituting any general claim for me ntal suffering 
and damage out of fear of opening up all past communications to dis­
covery."330 Such " result would clearly be an intolerable and over­
broad intrusion into the patient 's privacy, not sufficie ntly limited to 
the legitimate state interes t embodied in the provision and would cre­
ate oppo rtunities for harassme nt and blackmail. "331 Accordingly, the 
court construed the exception as a " limited waiver concomitant with 
the purposes of the exception."332 
More recently, the EEOC noted the importance of a court's con­
struction of waiver of the psychothe rapist-patient privilege to the 
agency's ability to bring actions t o re medy incidents of discrimination. 
When , in a class action race discrimination case, a magistrate judge 
de nied a defendant 's motion to compel discovery of, among othe r 
things, the plaintiffs ' mental he alth histories and records, the agency's 
regional attorney praised the ruling as " one of those genuinely impor­
tant court decisions which, u nfortunately, sometimes disappear with­
out ever making it ont o the radar screen."333 The attorney noted that 
the magistrate judge " forcefull y rejected the employer's attempt to 
use discovery to put the lives of victims of employme nt discrimination 
under the microscope " and tha t it was "good to win this one and to 
see civil rights litigants protected fr om having their lives turned up­
side-down and unnecessarily subjected to the proverbial ' third 
degree.' "334 
Before the Jaffee opinion , one commentator noted that compelled 
me ntal examinations unde r Rule 35 
330. In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 570 (Cal. 1970) . 
331. Jd. 
332. Id. (holding that t he communications subject to disclosure must be " directly relevant" to 
the specific conditions alleged by the plaintiff in seeking damages for personal injuries, and not 
for "other aspects of t he patient-litigant's personality, even though t hey may in some sense, be 
'relevant' to t he substantive issues of litigation."). 
333. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Federal Court Sharply Limits 
E mployer's A ttempt to Probe Job Bias Victims ' Medical, Arrest and Litigation Histories (Nov. 
29, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ press/11 -29-07.htrnl (hereinafter EEOC Press Re ­
lease] (quoting John Hendrickson). The court ha d adopted a somewhat narrow view of the 
waiver and held that merely asserting claims for emotional distress did not in itself effectu ate a 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege provided that the plaintiffs limited their claims to 
" negative emotions .. . experienced as the intrinsic result of the defendant's alleged conduct. " 
EEOC v. Area E rectors, Inc., 247 F.R.D . 549, 552 (N. D. Ill. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
334. EEOC Press Release, supra note 333. 
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may best serve defendants not by illumin ating facts at issue in a 
case, but by intimidating potential sexual harassment plaintiffs into 
silence. The scope of such examinations can be dauntingly broad 
and invasive, permitting inquiry into the plai ntiff's entire psycholog­
ical and sexual history. The specter of this invasive inquiry may dis­
courage victi ms fro m bringing valid claims.335 
Given that many consider disclosure of psychotherapy notes to be 
even more invasive, one can assume that such disclosure serves as a 
more significa nt deterrent tha n does the possibility of a psychological 
examination. 
Moreover, where plaintiffs are not dissuaded altogether from bring­
ing claims , they may attempt to avoid triggering a finding of implied 
waiver by narrowing their claims. In light of the case law reviewed 
above, astute plaintiffs ' attorneys will e ngage in careful complaint­
drafting or make subsequent amendme nts to pleadings where they 
seek to preserve their clients' privilege.336 For exa mple , in Santelli v. 
Electro-Motive, the plaintiff avoided waiver only by restricting her 
damages claim to " nega tive emotions" such as " humiliation, embar­
rassment, and other similar e motions ... as the intrinsic result of the 
defendant's alleged conduct."337 She was barred from presenting any 
evide nce of "symptoms or conditions that she suffered (e.g. sleepless­
ness , nervousness, depression)."338 As a direct result of these self-im­
posed limitations, her communications with her psychotherapist were 
" no longer relevant" and for that reason there would be no waiver of 
the privilege.339 Similarly, in Koch v. Cox , the appellate court noted 
that the plaintiff's complaint made no reference to e motional distress 
damages, eliminating one of the defendant's bases for seeking psycho­
therapy records.340 Although courts generally deny access to the 
records as a result of such strategic pleading, the final result is of 
course a victory for the defendants since they succeed in avoiding any 
exposure to liability for e motional distress damages.341 
335. Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272. 
336. See, e.g. , In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing the trial court's finding of 
waiver in part because the plaintiff had withdrawn his emotional distress claim); Doe v. Mercer 
Island Sch. Dist., No. 400, No. Ol6-395JLR, 2006 WL 3361777, at *1 (W.O. Wash. Nov. 20, 2006) 
(noting that the plaintiff dropped his emotional damages claim). 
337. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D . 306, 309 (N.D. IU. 1999). 
338. Jd. 
339. /d. ; see also Krocka v. City of Chi., 193 F.R.D. 542, 544 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (imposing limita­
tions similar to those in Sante/It). 
340. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
341. See Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309 (noting that the plaintiffs success in avoiding waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege was " a meager victory,» because the limitations on the evi­
dence she could offer " may prevent her from fully recovering for her alleged emotional dis­
tress"); see also Covell v. CNG lransmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202, 206 (M. D . Pa. 1994) (pre­
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Some courts require plaintiffs to take steps to clarify or curtail their 
claims as a condition for enforcement of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. For example, in the recent case of Duck v. Port Jefferson 
School District, the magistrate judge ruled that he would deny the de­
fendants ' motion to compel disclosure of the plaintiffs mental health 
records with respect to those records unrelated to the facts of the case, 
provided that [the plai ntiff] file a statement th at she is seeking only 
"garden variety" emotional distress claims, that she does not have 
" any permanent emotional distress or damage" from the underlying 
events, wiU not call a mental health expert witness at trial, and has 
not suffered any physical injuries as a result of the defendants ' al ­
leged conduct.342 
The Santelli court noted: " Parties ... know for certain that if they 
want to maintain the [psychotherapist-pa tient] privilege, they cannot 
seek emotional distress damages."343 The question is whether that 
kind of certainty is an acceptable consequence of courts' approach to 
implied waiver. A psychologist has hypothesized that women likely 
scale back their sexual harassment claims for emotional damages and 
choose not to offer testimony of an expert witness to avoid findings 
that they have waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which 
would open up their entire mental health history.344 H owever, such 
stra tegic decisions will result in juries hearing no expert testimony on 
the psychological impact of sexual harassment, potentially undermin­
ing plaintiffs' arguments on both liability and damages.345 These con­
fined claims also undermine one of the stated goals of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, which was enacted after Congress had determined that 
" additional remedies under Fede ral law are needed to deter unlawful 
harassment and inte ntional discrimination in the workplace."346 
Jaffee case recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege in which the plaintiff withdrew her 
claims for " pain, suffering, etc. " during litigation apparently after defendants sought her psycho­
therapy records). 
342. Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E .D.N.Y. Jan. 
25, 2008) (ordering the plaintiff to produce all " records relevant to the emotional distress that 
she claims in this action"); see also EEOC v. Area Erectors, Inc., 247 F .R.D. 549 (N.D. Ill. 2007); 
Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 227 (D .N.J. 2000). 
343. Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309. 
344. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 109; see also McDonald & Kulick, supra note 29, at 
xxxvii (observing that plaintiffs have responded to defendants' broad access to mental health 
records by curtailing their own use of mental health experts in litigation, eliminating one of 
defendants' arguments in support of an order compelling disclosure of a plaintiffs mental health 
history) . 
345. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 110. 
346. Pub. L. No . 102-166, § 2(1) , 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U .S.C. § 1981) . One of the 
stated purposes of the statute was "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimina­
tion and unlawful harassment in the workplace. " !d. § 3(1). 
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For ADA cases in particular, the result could be especially ironic. 
The construction of waiver should be more, not less , narrow where the 
jury is not being aske d to quantify emotional injury or to determine its 
cause but only to make a threshold finding of whether someone is 
disabled. The purpose of the ADA would be undermined as well if 
one subset of people with disabilities- those with mental illness­
found that their valued legal right to prevent disclosure of mental 
health treatment records had been quickly discarded solely because 
they tried to vindicate their right to be free from discrimination based 
on having the conditions for which they received such treatment.347 
As the federal courts emphasize repeatedly, privileges are regarded 
with disfavor in the courts. However, once we have determined that a 
set of communications is among those warranting the protection of a 
privilege, that protection must be meaningful. Courts and defendants 
are unrealistic in their demand for cost-free privileges. There is no 
question that there is a cost imposed by maintaining the secrecy of a 
certain kind of relevant evidence, but finding waiver and compelling 
disclosure of psychotherapy records are not cost-free alternatives. 
Such actions broadly discourage people with a history of mental 
health treatment from seeking the full range of remedies available 
through federal litigation for deprivation of their rights under the 
Constitution or the civil rights laws e nacted by Congress. Indeed, one 
district court explicitly adopting the narrow approach to waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege reasoned that " for policy reasons, a 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be narrowly 
construed, particularly in civil rights cases where Congress has placed 
much importance on litigants' access to the courts and the remedial 
nature of such suits."348 As Justice Goldberg noted in Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder, a court cannot conclude that " a plaintiff has waived a right by 
exercising his right of access to the federal courts."349 
B. An Alternative Approach to Waiver 
In order to serve a rights-vindicating instrumental rationale, and to 
limit the other costs of an uncertain privilege- most notably the bur­
den on courts and litigants to litigate the issue of waiver repeatedly­
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one purpose of the ADA is "to provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individ­
uals with disabilities."). Cf Smith, supra note 323, at 71-72 (arguing that requiring ADA plain­
tiffs to provide medical proof of their disability serves to disempower people with disabilities by, 
among other things, compelling them to disclose detailed information regarding their disabilities 
and suggesting that the requirement may deter people from pursuing ADA claims). 
348. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
349. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964). 
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most fe deral courts will need to change course entirely in their ap­
proach to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.350 The fol­
lowing proposed approach addresses the most common scenarios in 
which these questions arise; namely, during discovery of psychother­
apy records, when a plaintiff has sought a motion for a protective or­
der, a plaintiff or psychothe rapist files a motion to quash a subpoena, 
or a defenda nt files a motion to compel responses to discovery 
requests. 
When a plaintiff resists a defendant's request for current or past 
mental health records , the first step in the analysis should be an initial 
determination, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure , of 
whether such records are in fact within the scope of permissible dis­
covery. As noted above, courts generally fail to consider tha t, even if 
a party has apparently waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
Rule 26 nonetheless permits discovery only of information reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and fur­
nishes a basis to shie ld certain informa tion from discovery based upon 
considerations of privacy, embarrassment, oppression, and burden.351 
At the outset, therefore, the court should consider whether all or any 
of the information sought by the defendant is "releva nt to the claim or 
defense of any party. "352 As discussed above, while this is a broad 
standa rd, courts should not fail to consider- and should require de­
fendants to demonstrate-that the information sought is in fact rele­
vant.353 At this stage, the court can conside r the time frame of the 
records sought and the relation to the plaintiff's claims and facts al­
leged in the action.354 For example, a court may conclude that the 
documents sought are too distant in time from the events at issue in 
the litigation or that the records are simply unrelated to any of the 
issues in dispute.3ss 
350. At least one pair of commentators has suggested that states have taken a more accepting 
view of the privilege and a far narrower view of waiver. Kent & Kent, supra note 195, at 480 
(noting that Michigan was one of the few states in which a claim for emotional distress alone was 
considered to have effectuated a waiver of the physician-patient privilege). 
351. FED. R. C 1v. P. 26(c). 
352. FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b) (1). 
353. Id. 
354. An example of a court giving a narrow view of the scope of discovery where psychother­
apy records are in issue is Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc. , 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 
1997) . The court noted that even where a patient has put her "mental condition at issue" she 
" has a right to have discovery limited to information that is directly relevant to the lawsuit" and 
therefore the scope of the inquiry would be limited to the extent to which the defendant's con­
duct caused her alleged harm. Id. at 709. 
355. See generally 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 244, § 2009, at 124 (" A specific request for 
discovery is measured by the court against the background of a specific case. What may be 
relevant, and subject to discovery, in one case of a certain type may be irrelevant in another 
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Specifically, there is little basis to require disclosure of me ntal 
he alth records that predate the incident at question in a particular 
case, unless such records served as the basis for a testifying expert's 
opinion, as discussed below. Courts should carefully evaluate a defen­
dant's " alternative sources of e motional distress" argument to deter­
mine if such evide nce could in fact be used properly to avoid liability 
or to argue for reduced damages under theories of causation and ap­
portionment. A preexisting me ntal he alth condition does not entitle a 
defendant access to a plaintiff's entire mental health history to fish for 
past stressors, trauma, diagnoses, personality disorders, or other facts 
that could be used to discredit the plaintiff. A defendant must make a 
specific showing of the relevancy of such past records to a claim o r 
defense asserted by the parties, even if the current treating psycho­
therapist created the records.356 Thus, considerations of relevancy are 
appropriate in the overall analysis of a dispute regarding the discovery 
of mental health records, but only with respect to the scope of discov­
ery, not to whether there has been a waiver of the psychotherapist­
patient privilege. 
Rule 26 provides other limita tions on discovery as well. A court 
may, "for good cause," issue an order "to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, emba rrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex­
pense. "357 A litigant's privacy interes ts may be considered as part of 
this analysis.358 Prior to Jaffee, when the existence of a privilege was 
far more in doubt and Rule 26 served as plaintiffs' primary means of 
avoiding disclosure of psychotherapy records, courts were much more 
willing to consider Rule 26 arguments to limit the scope of discovery 
of such records.359 Since Jaffee, however, the discussion focuses al­
most e ntirely on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege with 
little discussion of the outer limits of the scope of discovery. H ow-
seemingly-similar case. "). See, e.g. , Scaife v. Boenne, 191 F.R.D. 590, 592 (N .D. Ind. 2000) (de­
nying discovery requests on basis of relevance); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 1406, 
1408 (D.N.M. 1997) (limiting the scope of party's discovery request on the basis of relevance). 
356. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1997). Assuming that the 
court also finds a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it should consider conducting 
an in camera review of the records to determine whether they meet the Rule 26 definition of 
relevance. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D . 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
357. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(1). 
358. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 4{,7 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984); see also Kunstler v. City of 
New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *11- 12 (S.D.N .Y. 2006) (concluding that, even 
in the absence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, Rule 26 gives the court discretion to limit 
defendant's access to "what is plainly very sensitive information"). 
359. See, e.g. , Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'J., 163 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D . Utah 1995) (holding that 
defendant's access to plaintiffs psychotherapy records in sexual harassment action would be 
limited to those reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, which would be deter­
mined by the court after an in camera review) . 
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ever, there is no reason to disrega rd notions of privacy in making ini­
tial determinations of whether the information sought is properly the 
subject of discovery.360 
If the records fall within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, the 
next matter to consider is whether they are covered by the psycho­
therapist-patient privilege, and specifically whether the discovery 
sought consists of "confidential communications between a psycho­
therapist and her patient."361 This is a determination made without 
reference to fairness or necessity and considers only whether the 
records reflect communications made "in the course of diagnosis or 
treatment" by a "licensed psychotherapist. "362 If the privilege does 
not apply, then the plaintiff may be ordered to produce the informa­
tion sought. 
Assuming, however, tha t these two questions are answered in the 
affirmative- that the information sought falls within the scope of dis­
covery and also is covered by the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege­
the court should next conside r a defendant's arguments that the psy­
chotherapist-patient privilege has been waived through some action of 
the plaintiff. Many courts impose on the plaintiff the burden of dis­
proving waiver.363 This approach is misplaced. Courts uniformly view 
the burden of proving the existence of the privilege (i.e. that there was 
a psychotherapist-pa tient rela tionship and that the communications 
were confidential) as being properly imposed on the party asserting 
the privilege.364 However, a waiver, or lack thereof, is not an "essen­
tial element" of the privilege itself. Rather, it occurs only through 
affirmative conduct of the person asserting privilege after the commu­
nication has occurred and has the effect of vitiating the waiver.365 
360. For example, records detailing communications concerning sexual dysfunction might be 
the subject of a protective order where such dysfunction is not an issue in the litigation. 
361. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) . See United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 
104&--49 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1638 (2006); United States v. Schwensow, 151 
F.3d 650, 657- 58 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that communications with alcoholics anonymous tele­
phone volunteers do not fall within the privilege). 
362. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 15. 
363. See, e.g. , Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL 
2711534, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006); James v. Harris County, 237 F.R.D. 606, 609 (S.D. Tex. 
2006); Merrill v. Waffle House Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 
216 F.R.D. 632, 636 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 
1108 (C D. Cal. 2000). 
364. See IMWJNKELRJED, supra note 46, § 6.3.1, at 524-25 (" It is well-settled that the person 
claiming the privilege has the ultimate burden of proof under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) 
on all . . . elements." ) . 
365. Federal courts are generally divided on the issue of which party bears the burden of 
proof on the issue of waiver of a privilege. Jd. § 6.12.2, at ~. Some courts assume that the 
burden should be borne by the party with the better access to information and evidence about 
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Thus, the burden of showing waiver should fall on the party asserting 
that such subsequent action has occurred, rather than requiring the 
privilege holder to prove a negative.366 
In orde r to determine whether the pa rty asserting that there was a 
waiver has met its burde n, the court should focus solely on the actions 
of the privilege holde r, generally the plaintiff. The inquiry is whether 
the plaintiff volunta rily took steps t hat can be properly viewed as ef­
fectuating a waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege.367 The 
easiest cases in which to find a waiver are those where the plaintiff has 
specifically authorized disclosure of t he communications , or where the 
plaintiff indicates an intention to use the privileged communications 
as evide nce to support her claim, such as to demonstrate damages or 
the fact of a disability. She may do so by designating a psychothera­
pist as an expert witness , producing mental health records through au­
tomatic disclosure or otherwise in t he discovery process, 368 signing 
release forms, or turning the records over to third parties who are not 
covered by that o r another privilege.369 
If the defendant argues t hat a waiver is implied by other conduct, 
courts should consider whether a plaintiff has truly attempted to use 
" the privilege as a sword instead of a shield."370 Where the plaintiff 
seeks no claim to recover for payment of mental health treatment re­
lated to the accident and lists no mental health provider as a witness , 
there can generally be no finding that t he plaintiff has made an " of-
the circumstances of a waiver, which would be the holder of the privilege. !d. § 6.12.2, at 845. 
Other courts have set forth a burden-shifting analysis under which after the privilege holder has 
demonstrated the existence of the privilege itself, a burden of " going forward " shifts to the other 
party which must produce evidence upon which a fact finder could find that the privilege has 
been waived. See, e.g. , Carmona v. State, 947 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) . 
366. See Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1999) ("The party seeking to overcome 
the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege has been waived."). 
367. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir . 2008) (concluding that there was no waiver 
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by the plaintiff where " nothing in the record [ J suggests 
that [the plaintiff] made a knowing election to waive" the privilege). 
368. See generally FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (describing categories of information and docu­
ments that must be provided even in the absence of a specific discovery request); FED. R. Ctv. P . 
26( a)(2) (information to be disclosed regarding any potential trial witness who may offer expert 
opinion testimony); FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (interrogatories to be answered under oath); FED. R. Ctv. 
P. 34 (request for production of documents). 
369. Providing records to her attorney would not limit a plaintiffs ability to later claim privi­
lege since communications with her attorney are themselves covered by a privilege. lM­
wrNKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60. 
370. Johnson , 977 P.2d at 157; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and 
the Li1igalor, 84 MrcH. L. REv. 1605, 1607 (1986) ("[T]he principle concern is selective use of 
privileged materials to garble the truth, which mandates giving the opponent access to related 
privileged material to set the record straight.") (referring to the attorney-client privilege). 
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fe nsive use of t he privilege" upon which a court could infer waiver.371 
And where an act effectuating waiver is fou nd, it should operate as an 
implied waiver only as to confidential communications connected to 
such waiver. 
Thus, even where a plaintiff lists a mental health professional as an 
expert witness, the scope of t he privilege waiver reaches o nly those 
communications upon which the expert bases her opinion.372 In the 
case of a trea ting psychotherapist offering an opinion, this would nec­
essarily include communications between t he plaintiff and t he psycho­
t herapist. Similarly, if the t reating or consulting t herapist reviewed 
notes and records from other t reatment and relied upon t hose in 
reaching t he expert opinions to be offered at trial, such records would 
also be subject to discovery. H owever, if t he psychotherapist has not 
relied upon the t reatment records of other psychotherapists , t hen 
t here is no basis to use waiver as a rationale for requiring disclo­
sure.373 A defend ant may ask the plaintiff whether she has sought any 
o ther mental health t reatment, and an expert's failure to review o r 
consider other diagnos tic impressions and t reatment records is cer­
tainly fair fodde r fo r cross-examina tion, but it does not warrant a 
court order compelling plaintiff to produce t he content of such other 
t reatment records.374 
A court cannot assume that any claim fo r emotional harm or mental 
disability will necessarily involve expert testimony. Unquestionably, a 
plaintiff can present emotional distress testimony without expert testi­
mony375 or offer her own testimony in support of claim of mental disa­
371. Johnson , 977 P.2d at 157. 
372. A party is entitled to discovery of " the data or other information considered by the [op­
posing party's designated expert] witness in forming [her] opinions." FED. R. C.v. P . 
26( a)(2) (B) . 
373. If a party withholds psychotherapy records from the expert witness, such records would 
not be subject to discovery under either Rule 26 or as a result of waiver of the psychotherapist­
patient privilege. The court in Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999), while 
finding no waiver, rejected the " narrow waiver rule," because it would " enable a party who had 
undergone psychotherapy to offer at trial only the testimony of a retained, non -treating expert 
and thereby prevent discovery of what she had told her treating psychotherapist." /d. at 308. 
This ability to present only a "selective 'history'" of one's mental health treatment would 
" thwart the truth seeking process by using the privilege as both a shield and a sword. " /d. While 
the court may not approve of the result of the recognition of the privilege in Jaffee, the basic 
principles underlying privileges and waivers would indeed result in restricted access to poten­
tially relevant information. See supra notes 218-259 and accompanying text. 
374. In addition, the opposing party may take the deposition of an expert designated by the 
plaintiff. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(b)(4) ("A party may depose any person who has been identified as 
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial."). 
375. DoBBs, supra note 24, at 832 ("[M]edical testimony is not ordinarily required to demon­
strate either the severity of [severe emotional distress] or its cause."). See also Lewis R. Hagood, 
Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM . L. 
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bility;J76 she may therefore choose to fo rego calling a treating or 
evaluating psychotherapist.377 Jurors can infer emotional distress 
from t he fact of discrimination alone. A plaintiffs decision not to des­
igna te her treating psychotherapist may ultimately make it more diffi­
cult for her to convince a jury as to the degree of her e motional 
distress , or the fact t hat she is disabled, but that is her choice to 
ma ke.378 Defense attorneys can use cross-examina tion, testimony of 
other witnesses, and argument to attack to the sufficiency of the plain­
tiffs claim .379 The key is to put the control of the issue in the hands of 
the party with the burden of proof as part of the strategy for the pros­
ecution of her case. 
A defendant may de monstrate implied waiver of certain records by 
pointing to a plaintiff's claim for recovery of the cost of treatment, but 
such waiver will only extend to communications directly relating to 
such costs. Courts should not be too quick to conclude that a plaintiff 
seeks such compensation based upon the typical, broad language 
found in the civil complaint's damages clause.380 A better approach is 
to require defendants to show that a plaintiff has made such claims 
through statements included in Rule 26(a)(l) " Initial Disclosures,"381 
or through answers to interroga tories or deposition testimony contain­
ing explanations from plaintiffs of the na ture of the claims they will be 
REv. 577, 582 (1999) (noting that federal courts generally do not require plaintiffs to offer expert 
testimony in support of claim for emotional or psychological damages); Walker v. Mac Frugals 
Bargains, Closeouts, Inc., No. Civ. A . 93-4135, 1994 WL 693387, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1994) 
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment and noting that "while it will ultimately be 
plaintiff's burden to prove that the harassment proximately caused her alleged [emotional] inju­
ries, she can do so without expert medical testimony.") . 
376. See generally Smith, supra note 323 (arguing that courts may not require ADA plaintiffs 
to offer expert medical evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability). 
377. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996). See also 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[E]xpert testimony is not essential to litigate the 
validity of [emotional distress] damages claims. "); Enforcement Guidance, supra note 260, 'I 
6226. 
378. See Hagood, supra note 375, at 583-85, 589. An absence of expert testimony in support 
of claims may also make any award more vulnerable to attack on appeal. /d. 
379. H ucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (" (l]t may be that the 
plaintiff- without the benefit of medical testimony- will be compromised in his efforts to per­
suade the jury that he has emotional distress that was caused by the defendants, and that is not 
instead the product of his preexisting condition. However, that will be for the jury to decide at a 
later time. "); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 (noting that although privi­
leged information may be " logically relevant" to a plaintiffs claims, defense counsel has "alter­
native means" either to " attack the weight of the plaintiffs damages evidence or to suggest an 
alternative cause"). 
380. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a)(3). 
381. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(a)(1). For example, plaintiffs must provide the opposing party " a 
computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party" at the outset of the 
discovery period. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(a)(l)(C). 
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pursuing. A court may find waiver only where, through such sta te­
ments, the plaintiff has indicated that she intends to include such spe­
cific amounts in her da mage claims. 
But even where a waiver is found, however, a court must nonethe­
less take steps to limit disclosure and ensure tha t there is a direct link 
between the plaintiff's actions leading to waiver and the records for 
which the privilege has been waived- the actual confide ntial commu­
nications she intends to use to support her claim. Thus, if a plaintiff 
includes a claim for recovery of the costs of certain mental health 
treatment, the waiver only extends to certain records regarding such 
treatment. For example, the billing, trea tment plan, diagnostic im­
pression, and similar documents may demonstrate that the costs were 
incurred fo r the alleged injury. Courts should not compel disclosure 
of trea tment notes and psychological exa minations, which are likely 
the most sensitive records, if the implied waiver is based sole ly upon 
seeking payment fo r psychotherapy.3s2 
A court may not conclude t hat the plaintiff has waived t he psycho­
therapist-patie nt privilege based solely upon a plaintiff's claim fo r 
emotional distress damages , a separate claim for negligent o r inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress, or an allegation t hat she is dis­
abled on the basis of a mental illness. In many, if not most, cases in 
which a plaintiff puts forth such claims and allegations, she will desig­
na te her psychotherapist or a consulting mental health professional as 
a testifying expert witness to support the claims. Because such expert 
testimony is not required , however, a plaintiff who has sought trea t­
ment, perhaps for the emotional distress caused by the defendant's 
misconduct and perhaps at another time in her life, may choose not to 
offer the testimony of a past or current psychotherapist. 
Thus, absent use of such confidential communications in support of 
her claim, a court should not conclude that a plaintiff has waived the 
psychotherapist-patie nt privilege with respect to those communica­
tions. Unquestionably, such psychotherapis ts may have relevant and 
revealing evidence to offer the fac t fi nder, and such a reading of 
waiver would keep the evide nce from the fact finder.383 But basing a 
382. A plaintiff would likely offer in evidence some record of payment for treatment in sup­
port of such claim. 
383. See Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, *11- 12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) . The court explained: 
In rejecting the at-issue argument pressed by defendants, we note that, in substance, it 
rests on the notion that access to treatment records might, in some not-too-specifically 
defined way, be helpful to defendants in preparing to rebut plaintiffs' damage case. To 
accept this notion as the touchstone of waiver would be inconsistent with the far more 
demanding standards generally recognized for at-issue waiver of other privileges, and 
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finding of waiver upon mere allegations of emotional harm is inconsis­
tent with underlying principles of absolute privileges and waiver in 
American law.384 As Professor Imwinkelried has noted with respect 
to waiver of testimonial privileges, the fundamental issue should be 
whether a litigant " introduces trial testimony that expressly or implic­
itly discloses substance of the protected communications."385 
Even where a court finds a waiver, the court should take additional 
measures to protect litigants and to follow the broader aims of discov­
ery and litiga tion. Rule 26 not only provides tha t certain information 
is entirely outside the scope of discovery, as discussed above, but it 
also authorizes trial judges to exercise their discretion to ensure that 
discovery is pursued fairly and appropriately.386 For example , courts 
should consider limitations on the disclosure of the plaintiff's confi­
dential statements made during the course of litiga tion to enable the 
would be particularly inappropriate in view of the very strong emphasis of the Supreme 
Court on the notion that this particular privilege is not a conditional one, that is, not 
one that can be set aside on the basis of a party's showing of need. If need alone does 
not justify waiver, still Jess can a speculative definition of conceivable relevance be 
sufficient to justify eviscerating this privilege. 
Jd. Further, enforcement of the privilege does not necessarily require exclusion of otherwise 
relevant evidence pertaining to a plaintiff's mental health and other potential causes of emo­
tional distress. Defense counsel remains free to inquire regarding these areas- with some limi­
tations, such as those set forth under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and Civil Procedure Rule 26, 
more generally- in depositions and on cross-examination. Bernabei & Schroader, supra note 5, 
at 33. Defense counsel may depose or call at trial other witnesses to testify regarding a plain­
tiffs emotional health. Fasman, supra note 37, at 537. A plaintiff may find that she has painted 
herself into a corner by not offering testimony or records from her treating psychotherapist. 
384. See supra notes 133- 155 and accompanying text. Further, because the state of the Jaw of 
waiver based solely upon claims for emotional distress is so unsettled, arguably, one cannot 
knowingly waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by including a claim for emotional distress 
in her prayer for relief on a complaint. In effect, courts fail to offer proper disclosure when they 
find implied waiver given the current state of the Jaw. See Berg, supra note 135, at 322-23. 
385. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 885 (emphasis added) . 
386. FED. R. CJv. P. 26. Rule 26(c), " Protective Orders," provides the following, nonexclusive 
list of measures that a trial court may take " to protect a party or person from annoyance, em bar­
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" : 
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; 
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery; 
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking 
discovery; 
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or dis­
covery to certain matters; 
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted; 
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order; 
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com­
mercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and 
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs. 
Id. 
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plaintiff to continue such treatment without concern tha t her state­
ments will be subjected to scrutiny.387 Thus, if treatment is ongoing, 
any records created after the request for discovery should remain con­
fidential and there should be no continuing disclosure requirement or 
subsequent request for records absent a specific showing for good 
cause.388 Similarly, any and all references to the litigation itsel£,389 re­
gardless of when created, may be redacted. Disclosure certainly 
would chill the sessions once a plaintiff knows that all records will be 
subject to a continuing disclosure requirement. 
Courts should also limit review of any mental health information 
obtained in discovery, including deposition testimony, to the parties' 
attorneys, absent a special showing of need, and courts should further 
require that attorneys not offer the informa tion in support of a motion 
for summary judgment or at trial without the court 's prior authoriza­
tion.390 To the extent that such records are filed in support of a mo­
tion, the court should seal and redact the filings to limit access to such 
information through users of PACER-the federal courts' on-line case 
filing system- or online legal research services. All of these require­
ments should be contained in a standard Protective Orde r issued upon 
the request of a party in a civil case in which mental health records 
may be sought or produced. Further, because a Rule 35 exam would 
be fa r less intrusive in many insta nces, courts can give plaintiffs who 
seek damages for ongoing and future psychiatric injury the option of 
387. For example, courts should afford plaintiffs some level of protection against discovery of 
statements such as those admitted at trial in Maday v. Public Libraries ofSaginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 
820 (6th Cir. 2007), discussed supra at note 41. The marginal probative value of such statements 
to the central issues in dispute is slight compared with the potential injury to both a psychother­
apy-patient relationship and the attorney-client relationship. 
388. See FED. R. Gv. P. 26(e) (requiring supplementation of prior discovery responses under 
certain circumstances); VasconceUos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 708 (D. Md. 1997) 
(granting motion to quash subpoena of records of treating psychotherapist based upon " serious 
concerns that the disclosures will adversely affect [the plaintiffs) psychiatric treatment"). 
389. Plaintiffs may discuss or refer to-expressly or impliedly- any otherwise privileged com­
munications in the context of communications with their attorneys. Since they are only disclos­
ing the communications in the context of another privileged communication, there is no waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege. IMWINKELRTED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60. Accordingly, 
in order to provide an additional level of protection against possible disclosure of such communi­
cations, or, more generally, the mental impressions and strategies of the plaintiff and her attor­
ney, courts should guard against disclosure of such discussions. 
390. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering magistrate 
to conduct initial in camera review of psychotherapy records to determine " if, and to what ex­
tent , the evidence is relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim for emotional distress" and upon the re­
lease of the records to "place an appropriate protective order on the materials to preserve the 
confidentiality of the medical information "); see also In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 572 (Cal. 
1970) (suggesting that a protective order may be appropriate where psychotherapy records are 
disclosed) . 
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submitting to such an exa mination in lieu of producing records of 
treatment.391 Finally, courts can tie the production of documents to 
the prospect of a triaJ.392 
The approach advocated here is not only consistent with principles 
of privileges and waiver, but it also provides several important advan­
tages to litigants and the courts. While court rules and legal principles 
must of course provide flexibility to fit the wide range of scenarios 
that may arise in a case, all participants in litigation-and those con­
templating or facing possible litiga tion- benefit from some degree of 
certainty on the questions that are likely to arise.393 At this time in 
the federal courts , there is little, if any, certainty as to how a judge or 
magistrate may approach a dispute over the application and waiver of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil litigation. As a result, 
waiver disputes must be litigated repeatedly, with no resolution of the 
broader questions raised by these controversies.394 
391. See FED. R. Gv. P. 26(c)(1)(C) (authorizing a court to "prescribe( e) a discovery method 
other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery"); Vasconcellos, 962 F. Supp. at 709 
(granting motion to quash subpoena of psychotherapy records where plaintiff volunteered to 
undergo a psychiatric examination). 
392. In Dominguez-Silva v. Harvey, No. Civ:3:04-CV-135-JTC, 2006 WL 826091, at *2 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 23, 2006), for example, the court concluded that there had been a waiver of the psycho­
therapist-patient privilege due to the plaintiff's inclusion of a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, but the court ruled that the plaintiff would not be compe11ed to disclose his 
mental health records unless and until his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
survived the pending motion for summary judgment since the records were not needed for sum­
mary judgment purposes. See also Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 558 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001). 
393. Since there are conflicts within the same district on this issue, litigants can enjoy some 
certainty only if there is a prior decision by the same judge or magistrate. However, given the 
number of recent cases in the courts of appeals, which appear to set forth rules but which pro­
vide little analysis, see supra notes 183- 186 and accompanying text, there is an increased chance 
that some lower courts wi11 feel compe11ed to reverse themselves. 
394. While this Article focuses on discovery of mental health records, because that is usually 
the juncture at which these issues arise, a court should also consider the impact on the plaintiff 
and her psychotherapy to the extent that such information is used as trial evidence. It is one 
thing to order disclosure subject to a protective order of such communications. It is quite an­
other to permit the admissibility of such communications at trial, which may be attended by the 
public and the media. Comprehensive treatment of the issue of admissibility of mental health 
records at trial is beyond the scope of this Article, but I would note that courts should be con­
scious of the potential misuse of such evidence by jurors and employ Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 or other rules of evidence to guard against such misuse. See In re Lifshutz, 467 P.2d 557, 
572-73 (Cal 1970) (suggesting that Rule 403 discretion should be exercised with respect to the 
compe11ed testimony of a treating psychotherapist "to provide substantial protection for the pa­
tient's legitimate interests"). 
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VI. CoNCLUSION 
The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege impli­
cates a collision of competing aims. The Supreme Court in Jaffee rec­
ognized the importance of mental health treatment, both to the 
individual patient and to society.395 The federal statutes underlying 
the plaintiffs ' claims in the cases in which waiver issues arise were 
broadly designed to discourage and to remedy unlawful discrimination 
and deprivations of federally protected rights. At the same time, our 
court system's central aim is to facilitate a sea rch for the truth, as re­
flected in a litigant's broad right to obtain discovery from other par­
ties. As a result of this truth-seeking objective, evidentiary 
privileges- legal rights that necessarily inhibit access to the truth- are 
regarded with disfavor. However, as one commentator noted more 
than twenty years ago with respect to courts' construction of the attor­
ney-client privilege: " loss of privilege protection should be justified 
by something more than antipathy toward the privilege."396 This ob­
servation equally captures the central problem with the conceptualiza­
tion of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal 
courts today. 
While truth-seeking is unquestionably a central and important ob­
ject of federal litigation, it cannot be invoked in ways that undermine 
the predominant goal of facilita ting justice. Courts must ensure that 
those litigants who have sought mental health treatment are not dis­
suaded from seeking vindication of their rights through the federal 
courts merely because they fear that their mental health history will 
become the focus of discovery and trial.397 As one federal magistrate 
judge noted: "Treating claims for incidental e motional damages as 
waivers of the [psychotherapist-patie nt] privilege unfairly disadvan­
tages those litigants who seek mental health counseling services as 
compared to otherwise identical litigants who refrain from seeking 
professional counseling."398 Courts must take an approach that fol­
lows the precedent set down by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and the 
legal traditions regarding both the enforcement and waiver of rights, 
while preserving the federal courts as a place where all litigants, re­
395. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). 
396. Marcus, supra note 370, at 1607. 
397. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("Amongst those in our populace who, 
through no fault of their own, find themselves on the plaintiff side of a tort case, there will 
always be a certain proportion who have sought counseling for unrelated personal problems or 
who are suffering from unrelated emotional difficulties. ") . 
398. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 
21, 2001). 
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gardless of their mental health history, can fairly seek compensation 
for injuries. 
Indeed, such reform will likely be ineffective unless it originates 
with the Supreme Court itself, which has thus far declined to gra nt 
certiorari on the question of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patie nt 
privilege.399 The Court must set a course for lower courts on this im­
portant question. Absent such guidance, the psychotherapist-patie nt 
privilege recognized in Jaffee will continue to be "uncertain " and, 
therefore, " little better than no privilege at all."400 Fe deral court­
houses will continue to be effectively shut to many potential civil 
rights plaintiffs with a history of mental illness. 
399. See, e.g., Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 127 S. Ct. 1815 (2007) . 
400. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
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